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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the impact of introducing the Basel III banking regulations. Specifically 
how it affects access to funding for innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs. Access to funding for 
these enterprises is vulnerable, thus an interesting question is whether Basel III improves or 
deteriorates the situation.  
The financial crisis had a major negative impact on the world economies and caused permanent 
losses, both contributing to a downward revision of prospects for economic growth. SMEs and 
entrepreneurs are key participants in improving economic growth, hence the question of how 
Basel III affect economic growth through possible changes in access to funding for SMEs and 
entrepreneurs is also addressed in this thesis.  
Both empirical studies and the discussions in this thesis find evidence of Basel III affecting 
access to funding for SMEs and entrepreneurs in a negative way. It causes reduced lending and 
increased credit risk premiums, affecting SMEs and entrepreneurs to a greater extent than larger 
firms. However, findings suggest that the country-to-country differences will diverge. I also 
find that SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to funding is dependent on the economic 
environment. Thus, a stable economy, which is the objective of Basel III, in the long term, may 
ease the access to bank lending. This effect also applies to alternative funding such as venture 
capital. Both bank lending and venture capitalists are procyclical in supply of credit, hence less 
fluctuation in the economy result in a reduction in volatility of the supply of credit to SMEs and 
entrepreneurs.  
Based on these findings the impact on economic growth seems to be divided. The findings 
implies a slowdown in economic growth in the short term, while future prospects will increase 
because stability in the economy reduce probability of a costly crisis and ease the access to 
funding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................ 5 
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. 5 
Preface ........................................................................................................................................ 7 
1. Presenting the Issue ............................................................................................................. 8 
1.1 Thesis Outline ................................................................................................................... 8 
1.2 Refinements and Assumptions ......................................................................................... 9 
1.3 Literature .......................................................................................................................... 9 
2. Introduction and Background ........................................................................................... 10 
2.1 SMEs and Economic Growth ......................................................................................... 12 
3. The Bank for International Settlements - Basel ................................................................ 14 
3.1 The Basel Capital Accord- Basel I ................................................................................. 15 
3.1.1 The Components of Capital ..................................................................................... 15 
3.1.2 Deductions from Capital .......................................................................................... 16 
3.1.3 Risk Weights ............................................................................................................ 16 
3.2 Basel II ............................................................................................................................ 17 
3.2.1 First Pillar - Minimum Capital Requirements ......................................................... 18 
3.2.1.1 Credit Risk ............................................................................................................ 18 
3.2.1.2 Operational Risk ................................................................................................... 19 
3.2.1.3 Market Risk ........................................................................................................... 19 
3.2.1.4 Total Risk Weight ................................................................................................. 20 
3.2.2 Second Pillar- Supervisory Review Process ............................................................ 20 
3.2.3 Third Pillar- Marked Discipline ............................................................................... 20 
3.3 Basel III .......................................................................................................................... 21 
3.3.1 Minimum Capital Requirements- Definition of Capital .......................................... 21 
3.3.2 Capital Conservation Buffer .................................................................................... 22 
 
 
3 
 
3.3.3 Countercyclical Buffer ............................................................................................. 24 
3.3.4 Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) ............................................. 25 
3.3.5 Risk Coverage .......................................................................................................... 25 
3.3.6 Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 .................................................................................................. 25 
3.3.7 Leverage Ratio ......................................................................................................... 26 
3.3.8 Global Liquidity Standard ........................................................................................ 27 
3.3.9 Basel III and Small- Medium Sized Entities (SMEs) .............................................. 29 
4. Impact of the New Basel Regulations ............................................................................... 30 
4.1 Cost of Funding .............................................................................................................. 30 
4.1.1 Modigliani and Miller (1958) .................................................................................. 30 
4.1.2 A Different Approach to Cost of Funding ............................................................... 31 
4.2 Basel Capital Ratio ......................................................................................................... 33 
4.2.1 Increasing Equity Capital ......................................................................................... 33 
4.2.2 Changing the Asset Portfolio ................................................................................... 34 
4.3 Impacts of Liquidity Requirements ................................................................................ 35 
4.4 Impacts of Leverage Ratio .............................................................................................. 37 
4.5 Competition .................................................................................................................... 37 
4.6 Empirical Studies ............................................................................................................ 37 
4.7 Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................... 40 
5. Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and Entrepreneurs ................................................. 42 
5.1 Capital Structure of SMEs and Entrepreneurs ................................................................ 42 
5.2 Sources of Funding ......................................................................................................... 45 
5.2.1 Equity ....................................................................................................................... 46 
5.2.2 Debt .......................................................................................................................... 48 
5.2.3 Government Funding and Venture Capital .............................................................. 49 
5.3 Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................... 50 
6. Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 51 
 
 
4 
 
6.1 Current Situation and Recent Development in SME Lending and Credit Conditions ... 51 
6.1.1 Changes in SMEs Access to Funding ...................................................................... 52 
6.1.2 Changes in Credit Terms.......................................................................................... 53 
6.1.3 Changes in Access to Equity Capital ....................................................................... 54 
6.1.4 Changes in Trends 2013 ........................................................................................... 54 
6.2 What to Expect for SME Lending and Credit Conditions After the Implementation of 
Basel III ................................................................................................................................ 56 
6.2.1 Effects of Increased Required Regulatory Capital ................................................... 57 
6.2.2 The Effects of Liquidity Requirements .................................................................... 62 
6.2.3 The Effects of Leverage Requirements .................................................................... 64 
6.2.4 Effects on Alternative Funding ................................................................................ 64 
6.3 Effects on Economic Growth ......................................................................................... 65 
7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 67 
7.1 Perspectives .................................................................................................................... 68 
References ................................................................................................................................ 70 
Appendix 1 – Basel I ................................................................................................................ 75 
Appendix 2- Basel II ................................................................................................................ 80 
Appendix 3- Basel III ............................................................................................................... 81 
Appendix 4- Modigliani and Miller (1958) .............................................................................. 89 
Appendix 5- Impact of Liquidity Requirements on Lending Spreads ..................................... 91 
Appendix 6- Capital Requirements and Credit Risk Premiums ............................................... 92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Basel II Framework Structure ................................................................................... 18 
Figure 2: Basel III Required Capital Coverage* ...................................................................... 26 
Figure 3: Changes in Terms and Conditions for Loans or Credit Lines to Enterprises (net 
Percentages of Banks Reporting Tightening Terms and Conditions) ...................................... 39 
Figure 4: Changes in Credit Standards Applied to the Approval of Loans or Credit Lines to 
Enterprises (Net Percentages of Banks Reporting Tightening Credit Standards and 
Contributing Factors) ............................................................................................................... 40 
Figure 5: Types of Financing Based on Firm Age ................................................................... 44 
Figure 6: Capital Structure for Micro- and Small Enterprises ................................................. 45 
Figure 7: Equity as a Call Option ............................................................................................. 47 
Figure 8: Debt as a Put Option ................................................................................................. 49 
Figure 9: Trends in SME Finance and Policies in ADB and OECD (2013)* .......................... 56 
List of Tables 
Table 1- Individual Bank Minimum Capital Conservation Standards ..................................... 24 
Table 2- On Balance Sheet Assets ........................................................................................... 77 
Table 3- Off  Balance Sheet Exposures.................................................................................... 78 
Table 4- Criteria for Common Share Tier 1 Capital ................................................................ 81 
Table 5- Criteria for Additional Tier 1 Capital ........................................................................ 82 
Table 6- Criteria for Tier 2 Capital .......................................................................................... 84 
Table 7- Assets ......................................................................................................................... 85 
Table 8- Cash Outflows ............................................................................................................ 85 
Table 9-Cash Inflows ............................................................................................................... 87 
Table 10-Impact of Increases in Capital and Liquidity Requirements in Lending Spreads (in 
basis points) .............................................................................................................................. 91 
Table 11- Capital Requirements for SMEs Considered as Retail ............................................ 92 
Table 12- Capital Requirements for SMEs Considered as Corporate (sales below €25 
millions) ................................................................................................................................... 93 
 
 
6 
 
Table 13- Capital Requirements for SMEs Considered as Corporate (sales between 
€25millions and €50 millions) .................................................................................................. 93 
Table 14- Equations for Calculating Capital Requirements (CR) ............................................ 94 
Table 15- Credit Risk Premiums for SMEs, as a Percentage of the EAD ............................... 95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Preface 
This thesis is written as the ending contribution to my Master’s degree in Economics and 
Business Administration at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). The thesis amounts to 
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exchange, I listened in on a Congressional hearing on the increasing scope of banking 
regulations and the repercussions they entail, which altered my initial, and exclusively positive, 
view on banking regulations. In addition, today’s focus on innovation as one of the main sources 
for efficiency of enterprises and development of new markets aroused my interest in how 
innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs will be affected by the new banking regulations. 
The thesis constitutes theory, empiricism and discussions on how Basel III regulations affect 
banks’ behavior; implications for innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs; and effects on economic 
growth. As of today, there is research and literature addressing both implications of Basel III 
on SMEs and economic growth, but little directly targeting or including effects on innovation. 
Due to the importance of innovation, I hope that this thesis can contribute to the literature by 
awakening interest in the advancement of research on these specific relationships.  
Working on this thesis has been both challenging and rewarding. There have been times when 
frustration challenged my patience, but I have definitely learned a lot and gained insight into 
many important issues.  
Finally, I would like to give a special thanks to my thesis advisor Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, 
professor at the Department of Economics at NHH, for guidance, comments, valuable 
discussions and input throughout the working process. I would also like to thank friends and 
family for feedback, comments and proofreading. 
Bergen, 15 December, 2014. 
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1. Presenting the Issue  
This paper seeks to discuss and analyze the effects banking regulations have on access to 
external funding, specifically bank lending, for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as 
well as entrepreneurs. SMEs and entrepreneurs play an important role in economic growth 
though innovation and job creation, which raises questions about how the new regulations will 
affect economic growth. The main question I focus on is: 
1. How will Basel III regulations affect SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to funding? 
In addition, I will pay some attention to the question: 
2. How will possible changes in access to SME and entrepreneur financing affect the 
prospect for economic growth? 
In order to analyze the issues described above, it is important to consider the following 
questions: 
 What is Basel III and what implications does it have on bank lending? 
 What are SMEs and entrepreneurs? 
 What is the capital structure of innovative SMEs? 
 Which sources of funding do SMEs and entrepreneurs have access to? 
 How will the overall impacts of Basel III on bank lending affect SMEs and 
entrepreneurs’ access to funding? 
 How will these changes effect expected economic growth? 
1.1 Thesis Outline 
This paper is structured in the same way as the questions presented above. Section2 gives an 
overview of the financial crisis leading to a change in international banking regulations, as well 
as the importance of SMEs and entrepreneurs for economic growth. Section 3 presents the 
background of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and an overview and 
explanation of the Basel regulations. Section 4 explains  how banks may react and adapt to 
Basel III. Section 5 attends to SMEs and entrepreneurs’ capital structure and funding options. 
Section 6 constitutes a discussion of the possible effects of the Basel III regulation on SMEs 
and entrepreneurs’ access to funding and thereby economic growth. In addition, it presents an 
overview of recent developments and the current situation of SME funding as well as the world 
economy. Section 7 sums up the major findings and conclusions from the analysis.  Sections 3-
5 is meant to give a theoretical and empirical background for the analysis made in Section 6. 
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Sections 3-5 are hence more general discussions of the issues presented before. Section 6 will 
combine the discussions and conclusions from the previous sections, and apply them to the 
direct effects related to SMEs and entrepreneurs.  
1.2 Refinements and Assumptions 
The paper will focus on the SMEs and entrepreneurs with focus on innovation and with growth 
potential. Due to the fact that both the long-term effects of the financial- and debt crisis are not 
yet known, and that the Basel III regulation still is not in full action until 2019 (Basel Committe 
on banking supervision, 2011), it is impossible to analyze or conclude anything about the real 
direct impact on SMEs, entrepreneurs and economic growth. This paper will therefore be a 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects one can expect to see in bank lending to SMEs 
and entrepreneurs, and growth.   
There is no assumingly ubiquitous result due to country-specific factors. The current economic 
situation differs from country to country. Although the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the 
European sovereign debt crisis affected most economies to some extent, the pace of recovery 
has been different. In addition, financial infrastructure and sources of funding are not 
internationally uniform. A last concern about comparing effects across (country) borders is that 
Basel regulations are not required or implemented in all countries, and the regulations open for 
additional requirements at national discretion. Consequently, the economic base for the analysis 
will vary on a country-to-country basis. In addition, there are no common international 
benchmarks, which may result in variations in the scope of the impacts of Basel III. Thus, the 
paper will comment and recognize some of the country-to-country variations, but will not focus 
on the extent of the impacts for individual countries.  
1.3 Literature  
Because the material and research on this particular topic is relatively new, the majority of 
literature and references used are articles by organizations, researchers and economists. The 
authors’ or the organizations’ points of view may consequently affect statements and 
conclusions in some of the articles. I still consider the chosen articles to be valid sources of 
information because they are published by respected organizations as well as economists in 
renowned economic journals. As a precaution, I have read them with a critical eye, and taken 
into account that the angle may have been directed by the authors’ personal view and opinions.  
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2. Introduction and Background 
In 2007, the financial crisis caused chaos in financial markets all over the world. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, many economies are still struggling to get back to pre-crisis economic 
levels and growth. It became evident that the international financial system was neither robust 
nor stable enough to handle a collapse in one (geographical) market. 
The financial crisis started with a boom in US housing markets. The increasing house prices 
created easy access to credit with real estate as collateral. Subprime loans are usually blamed 
to be the source of the crisis and it might have been the triggering factor. However, in retrospect, 
subprime loans were not the sole cause of the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
Instability in the financial market was built up over time.  Innovation in financial markets 
resulted in complex financial structures. The increased use of securitization; asset and mortgage 
backed securities; pooling of assets with misjudged risk rating; Special Purpose Vehicles 
(SPVs); and increased intra-financial investments created a chaotic web of financial 
transactions.  It was no longer evident who carried the risk, which led to errors in risk- 
assessments. At the same time, the use of these instruments created an internal connection and 
co-dependency between financial institutions globally, causing large country-to-country 
transfer effects. 
National authorities' measures to counter the development and scope of the crisis with standard 
monetary policy measures had little effect. The measures were based on the problem laying in 
credit risk, but despite the dramatic reduction in central bank interest rates, monetary policy had 
little impact on the market rates. The “credit crunch” that occurred, especially after the Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy in 2008, occurred due to liquidity- and counterparty risk. High leverage 
rates and lack of or decline in value of liquid assets resulted in difficulties in distinguishing 
those who were temporary illiquid and those who were insolvent, hence cash flows ceased. 
The second attempt to restrain the effects of the crisis was a more unconventional approach to 
monetary policy: Quantitative Easing (QE).  The QE is based on Keynesian theory, with the 
objective to secure adequate capital and liquidity, and to reduce expectations for long-term 
interest rates to increase spending and thereby stimulate economic growth.  
Although the QE seemed to have an effect on interest rates and credit access, in combination 
with increased government spending, it was a costly process. As a result, several countries e.g. 
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the PIIGS1 countries experienced a public debt crisis, which put an additional dampening effect 
on the recovery to a normal economic growth rate.  
The span of the crisis was wide; hence, it was later referred to as the great recession. The 
government debt crisis also highlighted a potential problem with risk assessments of 
government bonds as assets and collateral. Pre-crisis regulations were based on perceptions that 
government securities and bonds were close to risk-free, which the crisis proved, that this is not 
always the case.  
Some economists claim the current (at the time) banking regulations, Basel II, created 
incentives to seek out other financial instruments and solutions. Assuming utility-maximizing 
rational market participants and investors it might be so. Whereas others believe that the 
regulations were insufficient to capture the increased complexity and financial innovations, 
which led to excessive risk taking and lack of equity capital coverage for the increased risk.  
Despite the dispute about leading causes for the crisis, and whether too extensive or inadequate 
regulations created the instability in the financial markets, the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) decided to introduce Basel III. The new regulations are based on an even 
more complex regulative framework than Basel II, an attempt to capture the increased risk and 
complexity of the financial innovations. The motivation is to secure robustness and resistance 
in the finance and banking sector in order to reduce the probability of financial distress and a 
new crisis (Bank for International Settlements, 2014, p. 4).   
It would be reasonable to argue that the international regulations are born in the wake of a crisis, 
when the flaws of the current system and regulations become visible. The objective is to 
enhance the financial stability and improve the quality and extent of market supervision. As a 
secondary effect, the supervision seeks to minimize the probability of macroeconomic 
instability and an outbreak of a new crisis. Even though the intensions are reasonably good, the 
question is how this type of governance would effect the economy. The effects of banking 
regulations reach far beyond financial stability.  In the aftermath of the most recent financial 
crisis, no one would argue about the importance of a stable, functioning financial system. 
However, the question is; what would be abandoned in favor of financial solidity? And what is 
the economic cost of a solid financial system?  
                                                          
1 Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. Especially Greece, who were at risk of having to settle bankruptcy.  
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2.1 SMEs and Economic Growth 
In the aftermath of one of the most severe financial crisis since The Great Depression in 1929, 
which contracted the GDP in economies over the globe in 2007-2009, we still observe an 
uneven recovery in growth patterns. In addition, prospects of growth have been downgraded, 
and governments have extended the time horizon on expansionary monetary policy. The bounce 
back has not been as fast as predicted in the period immediately after the crisis, possibly due to 
the debt crisis in Europe (OECD, 2014, p. 27).  
In compliance with Keynesian theory2, increased spending as a countercyclical policy, will lead 
to a reduction in unemployment and secondary, economic growth. Increased spending, raises 
turnover in businesses, who then need more employees to accommodate the growth in demand. 
Increase in demand for labor puts an upward pressure on wages. In combination with an 
increased number of individuals with income, the demand is heightened even further. As for 
the labor market, increased demand puts an upward pressure on goods and asset prices. These 
effects are self-reinforcing and continue in an upward spiral. Thus, job growth is crucial to 
economic growth. Assuming SMEs are the businesses with highest potential for job creation, 
these companies are essential in providing economic growth potential.  
There are several factors contributing to economic growth, and there might be discussions 
regarding which of the factors are the main driving forces. Based on objectives for monetary 
and fiscal policy, it would be fair to assume that production (Gross Domestic Product, GDP) 
and employment carries great weight.  
In a congressional hearing of the impact of growing financial regulations, Alon Hillel-Touch’s 
testimony focused on the impacts the regulations had for new and small businesses. He stated 
that approximately 90% of US firms employ up to 19 workers and referred to the ADP national 
employment report, which revealed that companies with less than 50 employees created more 
than double the jobs as large companies in the last month of 2013 (Hillel-Tuch, 2014, p. 7).  
Additionally, a study by Angelkort and Stuwe (2011) finds that SMEs (with annual turnover 
of up to 500 million euros) make up 99% of all German companies, and employ more than 70 
% of all workers in Germany (Angelkort & Stuwe, 2011, pp. 6-7).  
The OECD Scoreboard (2014) states that SMEs and entrepreneurs are critical to ensure 
economic growth, being sustainable and inclusive (OECD, 2014, p. 1). Innovative SMEs and 
                                                          
2 His theory is based on demand specific or cyclical unemployment (Keynes, 2008 (1936))   
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entrepreneurs use their ideas to tap in to markets that do not exist or improve existing markets, 
which is a source for generation of GDP. In combination with the job creation ratio in these 
kinds of companies, they can be regarded as potential growth engines and they play a key role 
in scaling up national economies. Consequently, it is essential that financing options for these 
companies are established.  
As mentioned, the scope of financial regulations reaches beyond stable financial markets. The 
reverse side of the restrictions imposed by Basel III on the banking- and financial sector would 
be narrowing of activities essential to national economies, such as companies’ access to capital.  
A study on financial accessibility done by Asian Development Bank (ADB)3 and OECD finds 
that access to finance is the most significant challenge for entrepreneurs and the creation, 
survival and growth of small businesses, especially those involved in innovation.  This is a 
long-standing obstacle that limits SME growth in countries where SMEs have limited access to 
both debt and equity capital (ABD and OECD, 2014, p. 14).  
According to the OECD Scoreboard (2014), financing conditions for SMEs remain a pressing 
concern (OECD, 2014, p. 1). Large companies are usually backed by big banks and public 
markets, while new and small businesses often find it difficult to access capital. They are either 
not able to get bank funding, or they are exposed to high interest rates of requirements for 
collateral (Hillel-Tuch, 2014, pp. 6-7). Interest rates in general have decreased after the 
financial crisis, but the interest spread between SMEs and large firms have increased in most 
OECD countries. Whether or not there is a causal connection between interest rates and 
performances of SMEs is hard to say, but the scoreboard finds that SME non-performing loans 
and bankruptcies have increased in the recent past (OECD, 2014, p. 1). 
Alternative sources of funding for SMEs and entrepreneurs are good substitutes for bank 
lending, but capital from these sources is not acquired without difficulties. Government 
institutions and organizations attempting to ease difficulties of acquiring funds for SMEs and 
entrepreneurs, through guarantees and public-private collaboration, are not automatically 
granted (OECD, 2014, p. 1). In addition, investment capital and venture capital is often 
concentrated in regions, e.g. New York and Silicon Valley in the US, which makes location an 
important factor for SMEs and entrepreneurs. Development of such companies is therefore 
geographically restricted. (Hillel-Tuch, 2014, pp. 6-7).  
                                                          
3 See Section 6 for countries included. 
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3. The Bank for International Settlements - Basel  
Even though the primary focus of this paper is to analyze the effects of the latest Basel 
regulation, Basel III is an evolvement of the first Basel regulation. To be able to grasp the 
complexity and understand the effects of Basel III, and to be able to analyze possible effects of 
the new regulations, it is essential to compare it to its origin and isolate the changes that will 
affect today’s economic situation. It is therefore essential to get a short introduction of the 
preceding regulations.  
In 1930, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was established. It functions as an 
international financial institution and the main platform for cooperation between the world’s 
central banks (The Bank for International Settlements, 2014). Their main function between 
World War II and the early 1970s was to implement and defend the Bretton Woods system4. 
The Bretton Woods system broke down in 1973. Following the collapse of the system was 
several economic casualties. In response to these calamities, the central bank governors from 
the G105 countries formed a Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, 
later known as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2014, p. 1). Their purpose, according to BIS’s description is the following:  
“The Basel Committee is the primary global standard-setter for the prudential regulation 
of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its 
mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide 
with the purpose of enhancing financial stability” (Bank for international settlements, 
2014). 
The casualties caused by the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the oil- and debt 
crisis in the 1970s and 1980s brought attention to and paved way for regulation and supervision 
of banks operating on an international level. The integration and development of international 
markets and globalization created a need for regulations across borders. The need was amplified 
                                                          
4 The Bretton Woods system was an international monetary system established in 1944 to free international trade 
and fund post war reconstruction. The system was a gold-based and tied the US dollar to gold in the ratio 1USD 
to 35oz of gold. The other countries in the system agreed to trade US dollar to keep their currency fixed to the US 
dollar within a 1% range (Stephey, 2008).  
5 The Group of Ten (G10) comprises Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The group of G10 countries consult and co-operate on 
economic, monetary and financial matters (OECD, 2014). 
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by the Asian crisis in 1997, which created an international economic downturn. The BCBS’ 
first regulation was the Basel Capital Accord in 1988, known as Basel I (The Bank for 
International Settlements, 2014). 
3.1 The Basel Capital Accord- Basel I 
The member countries of the Basel Committee desired to slow down the liberalization of capital 
markets by curbing the erosion of capital standards that was observed in the 1980s (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2014, pp. 2-3). As the BCBS states in “International convergence of 
capital measurements and capital standards” (1988), there were two elementary objectives in 
the Committee’s work towards a uniform understanding of capital sufficiency measurement; (i) 
enhance international financial stability and (ii) consistency in regulations across borders to 
promote competitive equality in the international banking system (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 1988, pp. 1-3).  
In the 1988 Basel Accord (henceforth referred to as Basel I), the prime focus was capital 
sufficiency. The supervisory structure (regulation) devised was based on a universal risk 
appraisal. Credit risk6 is one of the primary risks incurred by banks, which led to minimum7 
capital standards addressing capital in relation to credit risk (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 1988). Basel I required a fixed capital ratio8 minimum of 8 % (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2014, p. 2).  
3.1.1 The Components of Capital 
The mandatory total capital backing of weighted assets was a minimum of 8 % and a core 
capital backing of at least 4 %. Total capital under Basel I is divided into two tiers. The reason 
for the classification of capital is that core capital (henceforth referred to as Tier 1) is the only 
capital element common in all countries’ banking systems. Tier 1 capital is also utterly 
detectable in published accounts, which is the base of the market appraisals of capital adequacy. 
Equity capital and disclosed reserves constitutes Tier 1 capital. Equity capital is defined as 
                                                          
6 Credit risk is the risk of loss if a borrower fail to repay a loan or other financial obligations at a point in the future. 
Investors are compensated through credit risk premiums. It is also viewed as counterparty risk of failure. 
7 The Accord’s minimum standards were originally meant for internationally active banks, which made it feasible 
for governments to impose national standards in addition to the international requirements (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2014).  
8  (Jablecki, 
2009). 
( 1 2)
( )
capital capital tier and tier
Basel capital ratio
risk wighted assets assets weighted by credit type risk equivalents
 
 
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issued and fully paid ordinary shares or common stock and non-cumulative perpetual preferred 
stock (excluding cumulative preferred stock). Disclosed reserves includes published reserves 
from post-tax retained earnings or other surpluses, for example share premiums, retained profit, 
general reserves and legal reserves (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988, pp. 3-4).  
Supplementary capital (Tier 2) are the other elements of capital up to an amount equal to Tier 
1. The capital elements in Tier 2 are included by choice by national authorities based on their 
internal accounting and supervisory regulations (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
1988, pp. 3-4). Details on capital that constitutes Tier 2 and restrictions applied to these types 
of capital are described in Appendix 1.  
3.1.2 Deductions from Capital 
The Basel Committee decided to include some deductions from the capital base for the function 
of calculating the risk-weighted capital ratio. The argument is that the committee wanted to 
reduce the probability of the banking system creating cross holding of capital in favor of raising 
capital externally, creating double gearing. Double gearing may impair the objective of the 
regulation,  because potential problems spreads faster between institutions in the system, 
making it vulnerable. 
For Tier 1, the only deduction is goodwill. In the case of total capital, the deduction included 
investments in unconsolidated banking/financial subsidiary companies and in the capital of 
banks/financial institutions. If there were no deduction practiced, a bank’s reserves of other 
banks’ capital instruments will have a risk weight of 100%. In addition, mutual cross holdings 
of capital for the purpose of unnaturally boosting the capital situation is not legal (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988, pp. 7-8).  
3.1.3 Risk Weights 
There are different methods for valuing risk, but the Basel Committee agreed upon a risk-
weighted approach. Hence, capital adequacy is calculated by linking capital to classes of assets 
and off-balance-sheet risk weighted by relative riskiness. The committee argues that this 
standard approach is preferred because it makes it easier to make international comparisons 
despite of differences in system structure. It includes off-balance-sheet exposures and it does 
not penalize holding liquid, low risk assets. The system has five classes of risk: 0, 10, 20, 50, 
100% and only focuses on credit risk. There are some exceptions from the standard risk weights 
concerning national differences, transfer risk, collateral and guarantees. These exceptions 
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together with applicable risk weights for on- and off-balance sheet assets are briefly described 
in Appendix 1, Table 2 and Table 3. 
3.2 Basel II 
Basel II is a revised version of Basel I hence, the regulations described in the previous 
subsection is applicable aside from the changes described here.  
After the release of Basel I, the committee announced several amendments to improve and 
expand the scope of the regulations. Despite the amendments, due to financial innovation and 
to better reflect the underlying risk, the Basel Committee suggested a new capital adequacy 
framework in June1999. In June 2004, Basel II was released. The new regulations constitutes 
of three pillars: 
Figure 1: Basel II Framework Structure 
 
Source: (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, p. 22)  
An important alteration in the Basel II regulation was increased use of banks’ internal risk 
evaluation systems to determine required capital.  The use of internal risk-weights required 
Basel II to form a detailed set of minimum requirements to ensure the integrity of internal 
assessments. The regulations expect national supervisors to create reviewed methods to assure 
adequate internal system methods for capital calculations. The argument for accepting internal 
methods was that it opened for using approaches more compatible with individual infrastructure 
and conditions of national financial markets (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, 
pp. 1-5). 
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3.2.1 First Pillar - Minimum Capital Requirements  
An extension of the regulations in Basel II implied that requirements put on international banks 
apply to not only banks, but also potential holding companies that own banks or other financial 
institutions that fall under the regulations. It does however not apply to any company that owns 
a holding company with these types of subsidiaries.  
3.2.1.1 Credit Risk 
Credit risk can be calculated using two methods, (i) the standard approach (in accordance with 
external credit assessments) or (ii) the IRB approach. The standard approach is the same as in 
Basel I, with some general alterations and additions regarding exposures to securitization, 
securities financing transactions, and derivatives exposing banks to counterparty credit risk. 9 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, p. 19).  For banks using the IRB approach, 
the Basel II regulation imposes additional restrictions on capital in Tier 1 and Tier 2 due to risk 
related to internal calculations. These additional restrictions are described in Appendix 2. 
The Internal Rating Based Approach  
The IRB approach is complex and this subsection is only an overview of the core elements of 
the method.  
The IRB approach provides banks the opportunity to use their own estimates of risk in 
calculating required capital for a given exposure. The IRB method uses risk components as 
probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and effective 
maturity. A bank does not have to estimate all components; but may use supervisory values for 
one or more of the components. The approach is based on unexpected losses (UL) and expected 
losses (EL), where the UL portion is produced by risk-weight functions.  
The risk components are used as input in risk-weight functions developed for different asset 
class exposures. Under the framework, there are five asset classes; (i) corporate, (ii) sovereign, 
(iii) bank, (iv) retail, and (v) equity10. Some of the asset classes have subclasses. There are 
different IRB methods, but they are all subject to minimum requirements.  
                                                          
9 The exceptions, additions, methods and calculations are addressed in Basel II section 53-210. Exposures to 
securitization, Securities financing transactions and derivatives exposing banks to counterparty credit risk are 
described in Part 2, section IV and Annex 4 of the Basel II regulation.  
10 Comprehensive definitions and conditions for the five classes of asset exposures are set out in Part 2, section 
218-243 in The Basel II regulations. 
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The minimum requirements for the IRB approach are related to inter alia calculation of risk 
components; supervisory estimates for the risk components; use of internal ratings; validation 
of internal rating; and disclosure requirements.  The requirements also apply across asset classes 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, pp. 52-53).  
Small- Medium Sized Entities (SMEs) 
Credit to SMEs is classified as corporate or retail exposure. Using the IRB approach for 
corporate or retail credit, banks are permitted to differentiate exposures to SMEs and larger 
firms, using reported sales or total assets as threshold and firm size adjustment.  
(1)  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  0,04 ∗
1−(𝑆−5)
45
 
* S=total annual sales [€5 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 − €50 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛] (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006, p. 64) 
Given annual sales above €6 million, the firm size adjustment is negative, thus reduces exposure 
applied to SMEs. Implications are further discussed in the analysis, section 6.2.  
3.2.1.2 Operational Risk 
The focus on operational risk is set out to motivate banks to carefully monitor the risk it attracts 
through it operations. Operational risk is defined as risk of loss caused by insufficient or failed 
internal processes, systems and people or outside incidents11.  The framework presents three 
methods for calculating operational risk; (i) the Basic Indicator Approach; (ii) the Standardized 
Approach; and (iii) Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA). Banks are expected to use the 
method suited for their operational risk exposure, sophistication and risk sensitivity (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, p. 144).   
3.2.1.3 Market Risk 
Risk of losses in on- and off-balance sheet positions merging from changes in market prices is 
classified as market risk. Market risk is connected to instruments and equities exposed to 
interest rates in the trading books, foreign exchange risk and risk related to assets throughout 
the bank. The objective for introduction of market risk is to encourage careful risk assessment 
of market positions by inter alia value adjustments, price verifications and valuing market 
positions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, p. 157).  
                                                          
11 Including judicial risk, but excluding risk related to strategy and reputation.   
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3.2.1.4 Total Risk Weight 
Total risk-weighted assets are calculated by (i) multiplying capital requirements for market and 
operational risk by 12.512, and (ii) adding it to the sum of risk-weighted assets for credit risk 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, pp. 12-14).  
The second and third pillar are important for the supervisory governance of banks and the 
financial markets, but for the purpose of this paper, it does not add value to the discussion. 
Hence, the following subsections will only introduce the main objectives of these two pillars.  
3.2.2 Second Pillar- Supervisory Review Process 
The supervisory authorities need to evaluate the banks’ judgments of capital needs and risk 
exposure, and identify inadequacies to secure effective effects of the framework. The second 
pillar sets out the main principles, guidelines and requirements for supervisory review, 
transparency, and responsibilities.  
The main objective of Pillar 2, in addition to keeping adequate capital to cover risk exposures, 
is to motivate banks to use better risk management methods and develop internal assessments 
more suitable for the banks risk profile. Areas to be considered under the second pillar are 
internal and external factors as well as risk that are not considered under the first Pillar, 
especially assessments of the advanced IRB approach (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006, p. 204).  
3.2.3 Third Pillar- Marked Discipline 
The objective for the third pillar is to enhance the two other pillars with motivations for market 
discipline, by imposing disclosure requirements on banks using the framework. With the 
introduction of an optional IRB approach to risk, openness about risk assessments is essential 
in the market. Disclosure requirements allows for more informed comparisons of market 
participants13 Disclosure requirements will make the market more transparent and potentially 
reduce cases of asymmetric information. Market participants will have access to key 
information about risk exposures, assessment processes and capital adequacy. (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, pp. 226-227).  
                                                          
12 Corresponding to the minimum 8% capital ratio. 
13 The disclosure requirements are presented in Part 4 section II of the Basel II framework page 228-242. 
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3.3 Basel III 
Basel III continues to build on the three pillars from Basel II. The requirements of the new 
regulations are more complex, in order to match the increasing complexity of banking and 
financial institutions. The initiative for new supervisory reforms occurred in the wake of the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009.  
Due to jurisdictional differences in the definition of high quality capital, Basel III has a different 
structuring of capital for the purpose of risk-weighted required capital. In addition, the 
Committee also felt that the previous level of 8% required regulatory capital coverage was 
insufficient (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, p. 12).  
3.3.1 Minimum Capital Requirements- Definition of Capital 
Under the Basel III regulation, total regulatory capital consists of (i) Common equity Tier 1, 
(ii) additional equity Tier 1 and (iii) Tier 2 capital. The total capital to risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) is still 8%, but common equity Tier 1 capital must be at least 4.5% of RWA and Tier 1 
capital must be at least 6% of RWA. This modification suggests that the committee has an 
increased focus on high quality capital.   (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, p. 28). 
Banks, banking groups and holding companies whose capital is being measured, will henceforth 
be referred to collectively as banks in this section. 
Common Equity Tier 1 
Capital approved by the committee to constitute common equity Tier 1 (CET1) includes 
common shares issued by the bank to meet the criteria for regulatory purposes15 (or the 
equivalent for non-joint stock companies), stock surplus from issuing instruments, retained 
earnings, accumulated other comprehensive income and other disclosed reserves16.  
Common shares issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties’ 
(minority interests) Tier 1, may be included in common equity under the two conditions.  (i) If 
issued by a bank, the instrument creating minority interests meets all the restrictions to qualify 
as common shares for regulatory purposes and(ii) the subsidiary issuing the instrument is a 
                                                          
15 Most internationally active banks are structured as joint stock companies. These banks must meet the criteria 
exclusively with common shares. 
16 Includes temporary profits under audit methods decided at national discretion. Dividends are not included.  
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bank17. Criteria for classification as common shares for regulatory capital purposes are 
presented in Table 4 in Appendix 3.  
Deductions from CET1 in addition to those proposed in Basel I and Basel II, is described in 
detail in “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking 
systems”, Part 1 B section 5 and 6 (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, pp. 12-15).  
Additional Tier 1 Capital  
The additional Tier 1 capital constitutes of instruments issued to meet the criteria for additional 
Tier 1 capital, but not included in common equity Tier 1 capital and stock surplus18 from the 
issuing of these instruments. As for common equity Tier 1 capital, common shares issued by 
consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties may be included, but under 
additional requirements. Minimum criteria for instruments to be included in Additional Tier 1 
capital are presented in Table 5 in Appendix 3 (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, 
pp. 15-17).  
Tier 2 Capital 
Tier 2 capital constitutes of instruments issued to meet the criteria for Tier 2 capital, but not 
included in Tier 1 capital and stock surplus19. As for common equity Tier 1 capital, common 
shares issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third parties may be included, 
but under additional requirements. Minimum criteria for instruments to be included in Tier 2 
capital are presented in Table 6 in Appendix 3 (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, 
pp. 17-19).  
3.3.2 Capital Conservation Buffer 
The Basel Committee suggests introduction of a capital conservation buffer for the purpose of 
making sure banks build up capital buffers in periods with little to no stress. The objective is to 
ensure that banks do not fall below the minimum capital requirements in periods of incurred 
losses. The committee suggests banks hold capital buffers above the regulatory minimum by 
for example reduce dividend payments and bonus payments or by raising new capital form 
                                                          
17 Additional regulations on how to calculate the amount of third party common shares by consolidated subsidiaries 
to be included in the bank’s common equity Tier 1 capital are described in section 4 in Basel III: A global 
regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems pp. 19-20.  
18 Stock surplus, not qualified for common equity Tier 1, can only be included in additional Tier 1 capital if the 
surplus origin from shares allowed to be included in additional Tier 1 capital.  
19 Stock surplus, not qualified for Tier 1 capital, can only be included in additional Tier 1 capital if the surplus 
origin from shares allowed to be included in Tier 2 capital. 
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private sector20, to reduce probability of breach of minimum requirements in periods of stress. 
The share of retained earnings for the purpose of building capital buffers should increase if 
banks’ capital levels fall towards the minimum requirements.  
The buffer increases the robustness of the sector going into a downturn in the economy, and 
provides a mechanism for rebuilding capital in the early stages of economic recovery. The 
capital conservation buffer is also part of reducing procyclical behavior by ensuring available 
capital to support ongoing operations. 
A capital conservation buffer of 2.5 % (Common equity Tier 1)21 is added to the minimum 
capital requirement. If a bank’s capital levels falls into that range, capital distribution 
constraints will be imposed on the bank (only on distributions, not the operations). The capital 
constraints increase with falling levels of capital22.  
The table below (Table 1) shows capital conservation ratios for different levels of common 
equity Tier 1 capital ratios. The capital conservation ratios in the table imply how much of the 
earnings a bank must conserve at given CET1 levels, unless it raises capital in the private sector 
(Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, pp. 54-56).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 The cost and risk of building a capital buffer should not be imposed on depositors and may not under Basel III 
be used as a signal of financial strength.  
21 Capital have to cover the minimum requirements (6% / 8%) before it can contribute to the capital conservation 
buffer.  
22 To not confuse the buffer with a new minimum requirement banks in the top rage of the buffer will only have 
mild distribution constraints. 
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Table 1- Individual Bank Minimum Capital Conservation Standards 
Common Equity Tier 1 ratio Minimum Capital Conservation Ratios23 
(expressed as a percentage of earnings*) 
4.5% -5.125% 100% 
>5.125%-5.75% 80% 
>5.75%-6.375% 60% 
>6.375%- 7.0% 40% 
>7.0% 0% 
Source: (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, p. 56)  
*Earnings is defined as distributable profits, before deduction of elements under restrictions, 
and after tax (before any distributable payments). 
3.3.3 Countercyclical Buffer  
A new addition to capital requirements imposed by Basel III is the countercyclical buffer. The 
buffer will be added to the minimum capital requirements in periods of excess credit growth 
and removed in times of economic distress.  The purpose of this buffer is to reduce banks’ 
procyclical behavior. Additional requirements in an economic growth period reduce access to 
credit24, while reduced requirements during a downturn will allow banks to stimulate the 
economy by continuing their operations. By preying on the countercyclical buffer, banks can 
continue activities without falling under the minimum capital requirements. The countercyclical 
buffer is an extension of the conservation buffer and distribution restrictions will be required of 
banks that do not meet the requirements.  
The buffer will be determined at national discretion by national regulatory authorities. For 
internationally active banks, the added buffer will be a weighted average of the buffers imposed 
across all the jurisdictions to which it has credit exposures. The buffer will vary based on credit 
exposure and economic situations in the range of 0% to 2.5%, and must consist of CET1 capital 
or other fully loss absorbing capital (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, pp. 57-60).  
                                                          
23  The CET1 ratio does not include Additional Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital to meet minimum capital 
requirements. A bank meeting the minimum requirement of 8% with exclusively CET1 capital implies the bank 
have no conservation buffer hence, it is subject to a 100% constraint on capital distributions.   
24 Excess aggregate credit growth is often associated with increased a buildup of system-wide risk. 
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3.3.4 Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs)25 
The Basel Committee introduces an additional requirement for Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions (SIFIs) in Basel III. SIFIs pose a greater risk to the financial system, thus 
they must have a higher capacity to absorb potential losses. Under Basel III, these institutions 
are required to keep additional 1% to 2.5% CET1 capital to increase loss absorbency. The 
additional requirements are decided by how important the institution is for the system as a 
whole (Basel Committee on banking supervision, 2014).  
3.3.5 Risk Coverage26 
To address the issues of capturing on- and off- balance sheet risks and exposures, the committee 
implemented reforms in Basel II and further in Basel III. These reforms seek to strengthen 
capital requirements for counterparty credit exposures, complex securitizations, repos and 
financing activities. The reforms also include the above-mentioned items in the banks’ trading 
books. 
The objective is to reduce systemic risk across the financial system and strengthen focus on risk 
treatment. Measures under the reforms are capital charge for potential market-to-market losses, 
credit analyses for externally rated securitization exposures, introduction of stressed Value at 
Risk (VaR) frameworks and increased risk weights (2%) for central counterparty exposures 
(CCPs) and higher capital for inter-financial sector exposures (Basel Committe on banking 
supervision, 2011, pp. 3-4, 29) .  
3.3.6 Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 
These reforms increase the standards for the second Pillar. Supervisory review with more 
comprehensive supervision motivates better management of risk over the long term. The 
reforms also reinforce Pillar 3 (market discipline) disclosures. Reforms to extend risk coverage 
focus on off-balance sheet vehicles and securitization (a big problem during the financial crisis), 
to improve disclosures of the components of regulatory capital and their corresponding 
accounts. Comprehensive explanations of a bank’s calculations of capital ratios will improve 
market transparency (Basel Committee on banking supervision, 2014).  
                                                          
25 This requirements apply to systemically important banks as well (SIBs) 
26 Part 1, II of Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems lays out a 
detailed description of these measures and calculations.  
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Figure 2: Basel III Required Capital Coverage* 
 
* does not include the additional requirements for SIFIs.  
3.3.7 Leverage Ratio 
From previous crises, we have observed that high leverage ratios have a negative impact on 
markets, asset prices, cost of funding (in contradiction to Modigliani and Miller 1958), and 
credit availability. Hence, the Basel Committee decided to introduce a leverage ratio 
requirement in Basel III. The introduction has two purposes. First, reduce leverage in the 
banking sector, and thereby reduce the risk of damaging the financial system and the economy 
in a possible deleveraging process. The second objective is to use leverage ratio constraints as 
a preventive measure against model risk and measurement errors in the risk based method. 
Unlike the complex IRB methods, leverage ratio is simple, transparent, and includes off-balance 
sheet exposures. Leverage ratio functions as a backstop for the risk-based capital requirements. 
It should however be emphasized that leverage ratio is a supplement and not a substitute for 
risk-weighted capital requirements.   
The leverage ratio is calculated by an average of monthly leverage over the quarter based on 
specific definitions of capital and total exposure. Currently, the committee has decided to 
require a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% in the time period January first 2013 to January 
first 201727.  
                                                          
27 Additional requirements in the transition phase are outlined in Basel III: A global regulatory framework for 
more resilient banks and banking systems, paragraph 165 to 167.  
0
5
10
15
Basel III Capital Requirements
CET1 capital Additional Tier 1 capital
Tier 2 capital Capital Conservation buffer
Countercyclical capital buffer
 
 
27 
 
Capital Measure 
The capital measure is based on the Tier 1 capital defined under Basel IIII. Any deductions 
form capital will also be deducted from exposure, for the purpose of calculating leverage ratio. 
Exposure Measurement 
Exposure is measured in compliance with accounting measures of exposure28, which implies 
using the accounting balance sheet. Securities financing transactions (SFT) should be included 
with accounting measures of exposure, but using netting rules form the Basel II regulation. 
Derivatives should be valued by the value of the contract or notional economic exposure 
representing underlying interest of the contract. The same exposure measure applies as for 
SFTs, but with an ad-on for future exposure to convert the derivatives to a “loan equivalent” 
amount.  
Commitments, credit substitutes, acceptances, standby letters of credit, trade letters for credit, 
failed transactions and unsettled securities, repurchase agreements and STFs (described in Basel 
II) are big sources for leverage. Hence, the committee has decided to apply a 100% credit 
conversion factor (CCF) unless the items are unconditionally cancellable claims, they then 
attract a 10% CCF (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, pp. 4, 61-63).  
3.3.8 Global Liquidity Standard 
Comprehensive capital requirements are important in securing a stable banking sector, but as 
the financial crisis emphasized, it is not adequate. Despite sufficient capital levels, lack of 
liquidity and proper liquidity management by banks resulted in a nonfunctional financial 
market. The rapid change in market conditions shed light on how fast liquidity is weakened, 
and the consequences of long-lasting illiquidity (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, 
p. 8).  
The Basel Committee decided to implement two minimum standards for funding liquidity, and 
a set of monitoring metrics to improve international supervisory monitoring. The regulations 
have two objectives. The first is to motivate short-term resilience of a bank’s liquidity risk. 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) will ensure that banks have sufficient high quality liquid assets 
to survive a 30-day pressured financing scenario (Basel committe on banking supervision, 2013, 
pp. 1-7). Further, the second objective is to ensure long-term resilience by introducing the Net 
                                                          
28 Netting of loans and deposits is not allowed. On-balance sheet exposures can not be reduced by collateral, 
guarantees etc. On-balance sheet, non-derivative exposures are net specific provisions and valuations 
adjustments.   
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Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The NSFR covers the entire balance sheet and motivates use of 
stable sources of funding and by that, addressing liquidity mismatches (Basel Committee on 
banking supervision, 2014).  
Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
The purpose of the LCR is to make sure global banks have sufficient accessible, high-quality 
liquid assets (HQLA) to balance out the net cash outflows banks might experience in a severe 
short-term (one month) stress scenario. This scenario involves remarkable stress, yet not a 
worst-case scenario29.  
(2) 𝐿𝐶𝑅 =  
𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠
≥ 100%30 
Or,  
(3) 𝐿𝐶𝑅 =
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝑄𝐿𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 30 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
≥ 100% 
(Basel committe on banking supervision, 2013, p. 7) 
Assets qualified as HQLA and cash flows, with factors31, are outlined in Table 7- 9 in Appendix 
3.  
Net Stable Funding Ratio  
The NSFR requires a minimum stable source of funding relative to liquidity profiles of assets 
and potential need for liquidity for off-balance sheet commitments over a one-year horizon, 
calculated as in the equation below. The NSFR motivates a better evaluation of liquidity risk 
for all assets in a longer perspective. 
(4) 𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 =  
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 
𝑁𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
≥ 100% 
 (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, pp. 8-10), (Basel committe on banking 
supervision, 2013, pp. 1-7). 
                                                          
29 Losses of funding and deposits or increased haircuts and required collateral and substantial calls on exposures.  
30 Gradually build up to a 100% coverage for both LCR and NSFR. 
31 A percentage factor to be multiplied with the amount of asset or item in cash flows for the purpose of calculating 
leverage ratio.  
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3.3.9 Basel III and Small- Medium Sized Entities (SMEs) 
The Basel Committee introduced the “SME compromise”, which involves that some loans can 
be viewed as part of a retail portfolio, given that total credit to one borrower does not exceed 
€1 million. A risk weight of 75% will be applied to the retail portfolio. The SME loans have to 
be backed by 6 % capital (Angelkort & Stuwe, 2011, pp. 12-13). 
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4. Impact of the New Basel Regulations 
Whether we can see the same impacts of Basel II as for the two previous editions of the Basel 
banking regulations is yet to be determined. However, there is no doubt that regulations change 
the rules of the game. Banks will adapt to the new regulations and that will revise their current 
operating strategies. 
It is difficult to predict exactly how banks will adapt to the new regulations. To address the 
issue, I will look at theory and empirical studies from the implementation of the previous Basel 
regulations. Empirically, it has been observed that in cases of implementing new regulations, 
institutions that are exposed to the regulations will seek to find loopholes. Until Basel III is 
implemented in full, these alternative and innovative ways of adapting to the new requirements 
can not yet be detected.  In addition, empirically and due to a gradual implementation of the 
new regulations, the affected banks and financial institutions have time to adapt and in most 
cases meet the requirements before the given time limit.  
4.1 Cost of Funding 
The cost of funding relates to the cost of capital based on the composition of debt and equity. 
One of the most famous theories for cost of funding is the Modigliani and Miller theorem 
(1958)32. Despite of the drastic simplifications and lack of assessment of changed risk of default 
with increased excess debt, it is still used as a reference when addressing issues regarding cost 
of funding and an assumption for many economic models.  
4.1.1 Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) concluded that “the capital structure of a firm is a matter of 
indifference: and that consequently, one of the core problems of corporate finance - the problem 
of the optimal capital structure for a firm - is no problem at all” (Modigliani & Miller, 1958, p. 
291).  
The 1958 article stated that despite the fact that interest rates may rise with leverage and hence 
an increased cost of borrowed funds as debt rises, the cost of funds for all sources is unaffected 
by leverage (apart from tax effect) (Modigliani & Miller, 1958, p. 273). MM explained this by 
assuming that leverage in any financial structure can be “undone” by obtaining a beneficial 
mixed portfolio of bonds and stocks through arbitrage opportunities. By doing this, the ratio of 
earnings to market value, i.e. average cost of capital from all sources, must be the same for all 
                                                          
32 Modigliani and Miller (MM) revised their article from 1958 in 1961 and later in 1963. 
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firms in a given class33. Thus, the rise in cost of borrowed funds caused by increased leverage 
will tend to be offset by an equivalent reduction in the yield of common stock (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1958, pp. 273-274).   
Criticism  
Despite the fact that it is necessary to make assumptions in order to make a theory, MM argued 
that the composition of debt and equity does not affect cost of funding. The value of the 
company is therefore not affected by their financial obligations or the capital distribution. The 
negative effects of leverage was seen in the most recent financial crisis, when banks struggled 
with acquiring finance, needed bailouts and went bankrupt.  Thus, the arguments in the theory 
do not hold. Although the MM theorem is based on the same assumptions as the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH), a perfect market with rational investors, the proposed usage of 
arbitrage opportunities to “undo” the leverage is in strong contradiction to the EMH, which 
raises questions about the validity of the theory (Choudhry & Landuyt, 2010, p. 85). 
4.1.2 A Different Approach to Cost of Funding  
In contradiction to Modigliani and Miller (1958), it is generally stated that equity funding is 
more expensive than debt funding and therefore higher capital requirements as imposed by 
Basel III will affect a bank’s total funding cost. This implies that higher capital requirements 
will increase banks’ cost of funding. That might be the case, but one also has to take into account 
that a higher level of equity, given unchanged assets, reduces the volatility of equity and 
therefore the required return. A second aspect is the fact that more equity makes a bank’s debt 
less risky and lowers the required return on debt. This might be offset by guarantees that might 
raise the cost of funding with higher equity ratio.  
Bent Vale (2011) makes an attempt to address the question of whether financial structure has 
an effect on cost of funding or not. In his paper, Vale uses the Modigliani and Miller theorem 
as a starting point (Vale, 2011, p. 1).  Assuming a bank is financed with equity (E) and debt (D) 
with required return RE and RD, respectively, the Funding cost (FC) can be written as: 
(5)  𝐹𝐶 =  
𝑅𝐸𝐸+𝑅𝐷𝐷
𝐷+𝐸
 
Defining an equity ratio e=E/(D+E) and assuming RE and RD to be decreasing in e due to 
reduced volatility and risk, one can rewrite FC as:   
                                                          
33 For calculations and assumptions, see Appendix 4. 
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(6) 𝐹𝐶 = 𝑅𝐸(𝑒)𝑒 + 𝑅𝐷(𝑒)[1 − 𝑒] 
To analyze the effect of increased e one can derive FC with respect to e34:   
(7) 𝑑𝐹𝐶 =  [𝑅𝐸 − 𝑅𝐷]𝑑𝑒 +
𝜕𝑅𝐸
𝜕𝑒
𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝑒 +
𝜕𝑅𝐷
𝜕𝑒
[1 − 𝑒]𝑑𝑒 
Equity is riskier than debt, which implies that the first term is positive. The second and third 
terms are negative because 
𝜕𝑅𝐸
𝜕𝑒
 and 
𝜕𝑅𝐷
𝜕𝑒
 are negative35. Defining the second term as the equity 
premium effect and the third term as the debt premium effect. Under the MM theorem, function 
(7) is equal to zero (Vale, 2011, pp. 2-3).  
In cases of the banking industry, possible guarantors are the government with deposit insurances 
and the problem of too big to fail. Even though the government does not necessarily volunteer 
as a guarantor for banks on a case-to-case basis, the fact that bank failures have a massive 
impact on the economy (as with Lehman Brothers in 2008) has resulted in several bailouts. 
Many banks use the fear of a collapse of the financial system to their benefit. The too big to fail 
mentality provokes some cases of moral hazard problem between banks and governments.  
Vale further denoted RDg as the required return on debt in cases of a debt guarantee. Substituting 
RD with RDg in function (7) gives an effect on the private funding cost (PFC) (i.e. total funding 
cost) of: 
(8) 𝑑𝑃𝐹𝐶 =  [𝑅𝐸 − 𝑅𝐷𝑔]𝑑𝑒 +
𝜕𝑅𝐸
𝜕𝑒
𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝑒 +
𝜕𝑅𝐷𝑔
𝜕𝑒
[1 − 𝑒]𝑑𝑒 >036 
Function (8) implies that in the presence of a guarantor the total funding cost will increase with 
a higher equity ratio (Vale, 2011, p. 5). Even though these theoretical calculations are under 
several conditions, the same procedure has been used by several economists to calculate the 
changes in cost of funding due to changed equity ratio37. 
                                                          
34 Note, because RE and RD are functions of (dependent on) e we need to use partial differentiation. 
35 An increase in equity relative to debt reduces the required return on equity and debt.  
36 The social funding cost i.e. including the cost to the guarantor of being paid less than the recognized fair 
premium, includes a term for the guarantors cost which is negative when it is differentiated with respect to e. 
Private funding cost is the social funding cost minus the guarantors cost. The derivative social funding cost is equal 
to zero, which implies that removing the negative term from the guarantors cost leaves the derivative of private 
funding cost to be positive. 
37 Kashap, Stein and Hanson (2010) and Miles, Yang and Marcheggiano(2011) (Vale, 2011, p. 10). 
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4.2 Basel Capital Ratio 
To meet the increased capital requirements of the Basel III regulation banks could either 
increase the numerator or reduce the denominator in the capital ratio fraction, equation (9).  
(9)  
Banks that already exceed the new capital requirements do not necessary have to do either of 
the two subsequent measures. How they choose to respond to the increased capital adequacy 
requirements is dependent of their own internal targets for capital ratio.  
4.2.1 Increasing Equity Capital 
An increase in the numerator can be done by either raising equity in the market or withhold 
payments to dividends and bonuses.  
A problem related to procurement of equity, e.g. through issuance of new shares, is the presence 
of asymmetric information38. New external investors have less knowledge about the value of 
the firm than managers acting on behalf of old shareholders. Due to the asymmetric information, 
present shareholders might become diluted because they have to sell shares at undervalued 
price. The imbalance of information raises another problem, the so-called “lemons problem”. 
Banks that are overvalued have the strongest incentive to issue new shares, which leads to 
issuance of new shares being interpreted as a negative signal to the market (Vale, 2011, pp. 11-
12).  
Due to frictions in the market for equity and the fact that withholding dividend payments and 
bonuses is usually not a popular strategy amongst shareholders and employees, it is usually 
preferred for banks to reduce the denominator. 
Most research papers look at a fictional increase of capital requirements by for example 1%, 
and the complexity of the Basel III regulations are not directly comparable with the stylized 
examples. In addition, effects are different in the transition phase from the long-term effects.  
In the case of adapting to the new Basel regulations, the required changes are known to market 
participants. In addition, the third pillar of the Basel II regulations require wide disclosure of 
calculations of risks and assets, which means that issuing new equity in the market does not 
necessary send a notable negative signal to the market. Bank owners might be more 
                                                          
38 A situation in which one party in a transaction has more or superior information compared to another. 
( 1 2)
( )
capital capital tier and tier
Basel capital ratio
risk wighted assets assets weighted by credit type risk equivalents
 
 
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customizable to raise equity in the market instead of reducing bank lending. The circumstances 
imply that a theoretical adaption does not necessarily occur.  
4.2.2 Changing the Asset Portfolio 
Reducing the denominator by adjusting the composition of assets, for the purpose of increasing 
the capital ratio, implies either reduction of total assets or a shift towards a less risky asset 
portfolio.  
Reduction in Assets 
The monetary policy works through several channels, normally referred to as the transmission 
mechanism. In recent times there has been discussion as to whether or not there is a channel 
that explains the reduction in credit in addition to the three standard channels (demand, currency 
and expectation) of the transmission mechanism.  
The “bank-lending channel” was first discussed in Bernanke and Blinder (1988), where they 
looked at the effects of monetary policy on supply of credit (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988). The 
bank-lending channel is a part of the credit channel, which looks at the additional monetary 
policy effect on loans to households and non-financial institutions due to asymmetric 
information. To compensate for the difference in information, banks impose an additional 
external financing premium. The bank-lending channel deals with the additional cost of 
borrowing for banks, which affects interest on loans and the bank lending practices. Increased 
cost of funding might reduce the supply of credit (Jacobsen, 2012, pp. 3-5). To what extent this 
might affect SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to funding is debated in the analysis in section 
6.2.  
Due to the simplifications and assumptions done by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) there are 
many discussions regarding whether the bank-lending channel exists, but several empirical 
studies has found evidence of such an effect. Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2010) 
researched the causal impact of the bank-lending channel and found evidence that it is the bank-
lending channel and not the loan demand or quality that causes changes in credit (Jiménez, et 
al., 2010, pp. 13-14, 39). They also found evidence that banks with higher capital ratios are 
more willing to lend than banks with lower capital ratios, which implies that as a bank is close 
to the minimum capital requirement they would prefer to reduce its lending rather than issuing 
new equity (Jiménez, et al., 2010, pp. 4, 10).  
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Changing the Composition of the Balance Sheet 
Furfine (2000) states that capital requirements is a necessary component in explaining the shifts 
in banks’ portfolios. Shocks neither in loan demand or capital, can simultaneously explain the 
decline in lending and rise in capital ratios  (Furfine, 2000, p. 14), which leads to a fair 
assumption that there is a connection between the structure of balance sheets and capital 
requirements. Thus, a probable preferred approach to acquiring adequate regulatory capital 
ratios.  
Acquiring assets that attract lower risk weights and substituting more risky assets, such as loans 
to SMEs and entrepreneurs would reduce the required capital to meet minimum standards, 
which implies a smaller increase in cost of funding for banks. This possible effect is further 
discussed in the analysis in section 6.2. However, shifting towards a less risky portfolio of assets 
will usually imply lower returns on investments. To avoid this, many banks use regulatory 
arbitrage opportunities to alter the profile of their “book”.  
Regulatory arbitrage is a bank’s effort to keep funding costs (inclusive equity) at a minimum. 
As mentioned, equity is perceived to be more expensive than debt. Provided that the capital 
requirements imposed by Basel III exceed the level of capital a bank would hold by choice, the 
requirements can be viewed as a regulatory tax. This taxation motivates banks to find alternative 
methods of adapting, hence financial innovation. Capital arbitrage makes use of deviations in 
true economic risk and the measure of risk in the regulatory framework (Jackson, 1999, pp. 22-
25). Basel III takes in to account more complex risk measurements to reduce the possibility of 
arbitrage opportunities, but as seen after implementation of Basel II, complex regulations for 
complex systems create loopholes. The most common criticism of Basel III is precisely this.  
4.3 Impacts of Liquidity Requirements 
Liquidity refers to the possibility of selling an asset or in other ways converting it to cash, 
without attracting extravagant losses while doing so. Most assets are liquid over a long period 
of time. By imposing both LCR and NSFR measurements, the banks have to take into account 
both short-term and long-term liquidity (Elliot, 2010).  
The Basel Committee published the paper “An assessment of the long-term economic impact 
of stronger capital and liquidity requirements” in August 2010, which attempts to calculate 
effects and costs of meeting capital and liquidity requirements. The paper use return on equity 
(ROE) as the basis measure, and compare the cost of adapting to new requirements without 
reducing the ROE. The calculations were done under several assumptions, including a standard 
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set of measures to meet the NSFR requirements; (i) change source of funding, (ii) substitute 
low-rated high yielding bonds for high-rated lower yielded bonds and if necessary (iii) reduce 
“other assets” (Basel committe on Banking Supervision, 2010, p. 24).  
The changes insinuates that a change in supply of loans is not necessary, but result in lower 
interest income or raises interest expenses, hence a reduction in net income  (Basel committe 
on Banking Supervision, 2010, pp. 21-23). To avoid fall in ROE, banks must increase lending 
spreads, beyond what is required due to higher capital requirements. A table listing the impact 
on lending spreads is presented in Appendix 5, Table 10.  
Banerjee and Mio (2014) did an empirical analysis of the effects of liquidity regulation39. They 
found that liquidity regulations have an impact on the composition of the balance sheet 
(Banerjee & Mio, 2014, pp. 1-3). However, they found no evidence that liquidity requirements 
affect the size of banks’ balance sheets or damaging effects on lending to non-financial sector, 
through either interests or supply (Banerjee & Mio, 2014, p. 26).  
Banerjee and Mio (2014)  also found that the adaption to the liquidity regulations was done by 
adjusting the share of HQLA to total assets, offset by a reduction in the share of short-term 
financial loans keeping share other assets unchanged. On the liability side, banks shifted 
towards stable non-bank and non-financial corporate deposits and reduced their dependence on 
less stable short-term funding (Banerjee & Mio, 2014, p. 26).   
I addition, Bonner (2012) and Bonner and Eijffinger (2012) fond in their studies of the effects 
on corporate lending by liquidity regulations, that banks below their liquidity requirements did 
not impose higher interest rates on corporate loans, but pay higher interest rates on unsecured 
interbank loans (Banerjee & Mio, 2014, p. 4).  
The limited impact on interest is in contradiction to the results of “An assessment of the long-
term economic impact of stronger capital and liquidity requirements” and theory of the bank-
lending channel. A substitution towards lower yielding HQLA and more expensive non-
financial funding implies higher cost of funding, which, as discussed above, have impacts on 
bank behavior. How these effects influence SMEs and entrepreneurs is further discussed in the 
analysis in section 6.2.  
It should be noted that changing the composition of the balance sheet to meet NSFR 
requirements by holding more high quality assets reduces the RWA and leads to synergy effects 
                                                          
39 It should be noted that the dataset is based on UK banks. 
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for required capital (Basel committe on Banking Supervision, 2010, p. 24). Secondary the 
substitution towards non-financial funding reduces the transmission of shocks through an 
interconnected financial sector, which was a substantial problem in the financial crisis of 2007-
2009 (Banerjee & Mio, 2014, pp. 1-3). 
4.4 Impacts of Leverage Ratio 
Because leverage does not include risk weights it motivates a high-yield asset portfolio. To 
maintain profitability while reducing the size of the balance sheet requires higher payoffs on 
the remaining assets. On the other hand, a higher risk balance sheet requires a higher RWA 
coverage, making it difficult to find an optimal combination of assets in the portfolio (Angelkort 
& Stuwe, 2011, pp. 11-14).  How the banks react will depend on the relation between the 
required capital and required leverage ratio. The required leverage ratio is assumed to be set at 
a level leaving the capital ratio as the key determinant of capital requirement (Elliot, 2010).  
4.5 Competition 
An important aspect of how banks will choose to adapt to the regulations is impact on 
competition. One of the objectives of the international regulations Basel impose is to even out 
the competition. Due to the possibilities of additional regulations at national discretion and 
difference in size of banks there may be some variation in competitive conditions. The ECB 
bank lending survey reveals an easing of capital standards due to pressure of competitors. 
Jackson et al. (1999) did not find any empirical studies that directly test implications of Basel 
regulations on competition. The testing done on stock market responses to increased capital 
requirements were mixed and did not give a conclusive result on profitability.  
Elliot (2010) stated that in theory there are many competing financial institutions and capital 
market investors, but based on his findings it appears that the capital regulations alone could 
not alone result in banks losing any competitive advantages relative to other sources of funding 
(Elliott, 2010, pp. 21-22). In addition, the Basel III regulation applies to a wider specter of 
financial institutions, which requires change in behavior for these institutions as well.  
4.6 Empirical Studies 
Regarding the empirical support of the development in the banking sector after the introduction, 
it is hard to determine if the development has a causal relationship with the introduction of 
Basel III. The European central bank provides a Bank Lending Survey (BLS), which monitors 
changes in bank lending and credit supply, and try to explain the changes. It should be noted 
that the numbers only represent the Euro Area. In addition, there are differences within the Euro 
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Area, which implies that the observed development in bank lending from the BLS report is not 
representative for all countries using the Basel regulations.  
For 2014, Q3, banks reported a small net easing of credit standards on loans to enterprises (i.e. 
a negative net tightening of -2%). With regard to enterprise size, credit standards were eased on 
loans to large firms, but remained unchanged for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
The results are still below the historical tightening average.   
The factors related to banks’ cost of funding, which led to easing of credit standards, were 
mainly the continued strengthening of banks’ liquidity position, improved access to market 
funding and pressure from competitors. On the other hand, banks’ capital position and 
perception of risk related to industry specific economic outlook and collateral demanded had a 
marginal tightening impact on credit standards (The European Central Bank, 2014, pp. 5-8).   
Figure 3: Changes in Terms and Conditions for Loans or Credit Lines to Enterprises (net 
Percentages of Banks Reporting Tightening Terms and Conditions) 
 
Note: “other terms and conditions” are calculated as the unweight average of “non-interest rate 
charges”, “size of the loan or credit line”, “loan covenants” and “maturity”.  Source: (The 
European Central Bank, 2014, p. 8) 
Figure 3 shows that the margins on riskier loans were much higher than average loans, 
suggesting banks required higher risk premiums for loans they perceived as more risky, 
presumably such as SME and entrepreneur loans.  The observed development of required 
collateral propose that the increased requirements for collateral was related to the economic 
situation, because the tightening effect deceased with time and improvement of the economic 
situation.  
 
 
39 
 
Figure 4: Changes in Credit Standards Applied to the Approval of Loans or Credit Lines to 
Enterprises (Net Percentages of Banks Reporting Tightening Credit Standards and 
Contributing Factors) 
 
Source: (The European Central Bank, 2014, p. 6) 
Figure 4 present the results from the ECB BLS, showing that cost of funding and balance sheet 
constraints had a tightening impact on standards before and right after the implementation of 
Basel III. It is not enough evidence to assume the sole reason is preparing to meet the first 
capital requirements, but it could be a contributing factor assuming the theory discussed in 
section 3.1 and 3.2 holds.  
Thomas F. Cosimano and Dalia S. Hakura (2011) tried to calculate and predict bank behavior 
in response to Basel III. Their paper considered the 100 largest banks and bank holding 
companies (BHCs), and examined the country-to-country variation based on commercial banks 
and BHCs in advanced economies, categorized in (i) economies that experienced the banking 
crisis and (ii) economies that did not experience the banking crisis (Cosimano & Hakura, 2011, 
p. 4).  
They assumed that an increase in future marginal cost of loans implied that banks approved less 
loans to eliminate the need for new equity. The major finding in their paper was that an increase 
in equity to asset ratio of 1.3 percentage points40 would increase the loan rate by 16 basis points 
(bps) for the 100 largest banks and BHCs. This implied an upper limit of 0.12 % higher return 
on equity relative to marginal cost of deposits, which is in contradiction to the MM theorem. 
The reason can be the too-big-to-fail mentality in compliance with Vale (2011). In times of 
                                                          
40 Calculation done by Kashyap, Stein and Hanson (2010) based on increased spread in lending to achieve the 
minimum capital requirements under the Basel III framework. Other calculations predict higher increased spread 
in lending, but this paper uses 1, 3 percentage points.  
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excess credit growth, when the countercyclical buffer is added, the equity to asset ratio goes up 
by 2.5 percentage points, which led to loan rates increasing by 31 bps, based on their 
calculations (Cosimano & Hakura, 2011, p. 5).  
The 1.3 percentage point increase in equity to asset ratio also caused a reduction in loans by 
1.3% (2.5% if the countercyclical buffer is imposed). For the country-to-country analysis the 
supply of loans in the long run would on average decrease with 4.6% for countries affected by 
the banking crisis, and 14.8% for the countries not affected by the banking crisis41 (Cosimano 
& Hakura, 2011, pp. 6-7).  
The paper also found that small changes in lending interest rates opened the door for regulatory 
arbitrage opportunities, and a shift from traditional banking towards shadow- banking as we 
saw ahead of the 2007-2009 financial crisis (Cosimano & Hakura, 2011, p. 21). This supports 
findings in Jackson et al. (1999), when evaluating the impact of the Basel Accord.  
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
As mentioned introductory, the effects of the Basel III framework is hard to determine, and as 
this section has shown, there are no definitive answer. How banks adapt to the new regulations 
is dependent on several factors. The theory presents possible outcomes, but the theories are 
based on stylized examples and the empirical evidence can not say if what we see has a causal 
connection to the implementation of the Basel regulation. In addition, economists disagree 
about the possibility and extent the alternative effects might have.  
Despite of the uncertainty it seems, as in compliance with Furfine (2000), the capital 
requirements change the incentives of banks, and hence bank behavior.  A likely conclusion in 
relation to capital requirements is that the way banks choose to react is dependent on the initial 
position of the bank42. If the bank is far below the required capital level it is reasonable to 
assume that a likely outcome is higher interest rates on loans and a reduction in credit in 
compliance with the bank lending channel theory, but to what extent is hard to say. The 
implications for SMEs and entrepreneurs will be thoroughly discussed in the analysis in Section 
6.2. Assuming a reduction in lending will affect these type of companies more than larger 
companies due to the higher risk weights they attract is a reasonable conclusion.  
                                                          
41 The calculation assumes an average demand elasticity of -0.33 for the 100 largest banks. Second, there is a big 
variation between the countries in the different categories.  
42 Regarding current capital adequacy and liquidity. 
 
 
41 
 
The interpretation of effects caused by the liquidity requirement is ambivalent. Empirical 
evidence suggests it will have little effect on bank lending and interests to households and non-
financial companies. In contradiction, the Basel assessment suggests restructuring the balance 
sheet towards more high quality assets with lower yield payments and expensive funding, which 
reduces returns. It is definitely possible that banks increase interest spreads to maintain 
profitability. In addition, as mentioned, a reduction in other assets might be required to meet 
the regulative standards, which again leads back to the assumption that SME will be more 
affected. 
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5. Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and Entrepreneurs 
This section will first define small and medium sized enterprises, entrepreneurs and the 
importance of these types of companies for the economy. Second, I will look at the financial 
structure of these companies, their possible sources of funding and potential problems regarding 
acquiring funding.  
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs)  
There is no universal definition of SMEs. For different countries and different purposes, the 
definition changes. A general notion is though a non-subsidiary company who employs less 
than a given number of employees.  The limit of employees to be considered an SME also differ 
from country to country (e.g. 250 in EU and 500 in The US). An alternative definition is based 
on revenues and financial assets (as in the Basel regulations) (ABD and OECD, 2014, p. 380). 
In this paper, the focus is on SMEs involved in innovation and R&D, owing to the fact that they 
have a higher growth potential relative to other types of SMEs, such as the local kiosk. Because 
empirical studies are based on different definitions of SMEs, the general definition of SMEs in 
this paper will be: relatively young enterprises with limited revenues and number of 
employees43. Empirical studies do not necessarily differentiate between SMEs with high 
intensity of innovation, which makes it hard to isolate my focus group of SMEs. However, the 
analysis in section 6.2 will address SMEs invested in innovation. 
Entrepreneurs  
There is no standard criteria for defining  entrepreneurs. For the purpose of this paper, I define 
entrepreneurs as individuals with innovating ideas who start up a sole proprietorship or an SME 
to develop and sell their ideas, or products of their ideas.  
5.1 Capital Structure of SMEs and Entrepreneurs 
Capital structure is somewhat correlated with the location of the SME or entrepreneur, mainly 
because of these factors: Market structure and conditions differ between countries, which makes 
the combination of capital dependent on the possible options and access of capital in the 
operating county. A second aspect is that variation in economic cycles and economic situations 
in the operating country will affect the access to credit and thus the capital structure. There is 
                                                          
43 One would expect a small company involved in innovation to be relatively young and have limited generation 
of revenues in the startup phase.  
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also a big controversy in empirical studies of capital structure of innovation companies and 
SMEs and little research on the structure in innovative SMEs.  
This section provides examples from empirical studies of capital structure for either SMEs or 
innovation intensive enterprises, with the objective to find common denominators.  
Chavis, Klapper and Love (2010) used the IMF enterprise survey to analyze differences in 
entrepreneurial finance. They used the age of the company to differentiate. Assuming 
innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs are relatively young, they found that younger firms relied 
less on bank financing in favor of alternative sources of funding.  As presented in Figure 5 
below, the use of informal funding decreased with the age of the company. The complete 
opposite is observable for bank lending. Despite this, they found that young firms had better 
access to bank finance than older firms, in countries with strong rule of law and better credit 
information and that the use of alternative funding decreased with the availability of credit 
information (Chavis, et al., 2010, pp. 1-2). Suggesting that a reason for young firms turning to 
alternative funding is related to asymmetric information. 
Figure 5: Types of Financing Based on Firm Age 
 
Source: (Chavis, et al., 2010, p. 2) 
Kuntchev, Ramalho, Rodríguez-Meza, Yang (2014) used the enterprise surveys to look at 
SMEs’ access to credit. First, they found that SMEs were more likely to be credit constrained 
and that the probability of being constrained decreased with firm size (Kuntchev, et al., 2014, 
p. 3). Second, they looked at the sources of funding used dependent on firm size. For the second 
aspect, they found that for financing both working capital and investments, bank and non-bank 
financial institutions was the main source of funding, but the use decreased with size. For the 
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use of alternative44 external sources of funding, there were regional differences. With some 
exceptions, the common feature is that use of other financing sources decreased with size, 
implying that smaller companies are more dependent on alternative sources of funding.  The 
use of equity to fund investments varied with respect to region, but in most regions, dependence 
on equity was higher for smaller companies (Chavis, et al., 2010, pp. 34-35).  
Kvinge (1997) studied the capital structure of small Norwegian industry enterprises. She found 
that savings and mortgages were in general the most important sources of funding for small 
entities in Norway, and that none of the sample entities reported using the bond market or issued 
new equity. Government funding was limited to the largest of the sample entities, probably due 
to lack of resources and risk assessments. From a sample of 427 micro- and small enterprises, 
she found the capital structure presented in Figure 6 (Kvinge, 1997, pp. 14-15).  
Figure 6: Capital Structure for Micro- and Small Enterprises  
 
*In percent, as potion of total capital, for businesses with up to 50 employees. Source: based 
on table from (Kvinge, 1997, p. 14). 
Short-term debt constituted the largest percentage of total capital, while equity was a small 
share. In addition, she found that the capital structure of companies with funding problems were 
similar to the structure of the micro- and small enterprises (i.e. high leverage ratio) and that 
they attracted higher interest rates on debt.  
                                                          
44 Alternative sources of funding is in the paper divided into categories, trade capital (e.g. supplier and customer 
credit), equity capital (including both present and new shareholders) and other external funding (e.g. loans form 
friends, family and moneylenders). 
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Sharma (2007) found trends implying that companies engaged in innovation used more bank 
financing. His research shows that compared to other firms, innovative companies had higher 
investments from banks and government funds. However, he found no significant implication 
of innovation affecting the use of equity capital. The patterns held for both large and small 
firms, implicating that capital structure is independent of firm size. On the other hand, his data 
insinuates that small firms face larger financial obstacles (Sharma, 2007, pp. 7-8). Based on 
this, it is fair to assume that small innovative firms are highly dependent on bank lending, but 
struggles with gaining access to credit. Another of Sharma’s conclusions supports this 
assumption; financial development is vital for allocation of capital to innovative SMEs 
(Sharma, 2007, p. 16). Thus, innovative SMEs’ access to capital is dependent on the economic 
situation because they depend on bank lending, which is procyclical.  
Aghion, Klemm, Bond and Marineschu (2004) performed a study of financial structure of UK 
companies involved in innovation and R&D. They found that companies involved in innovation 
used more debt as source of funding, but that the use decreased when innovation intensity 
increased. The share of unsecured debt was also higher for companies in R&D. The sample 
companies with highest intensity of innovation were most likely to use equity as a funding 
source and reliance on issuing equity increases with innovation intensity (Aghion, et al., 2004, 
pp. 277, 282-283). They tried to explain their findings with the fact that more innovative firms 
have more appealing investment opportunities, and hence are more reliant on external funding, 
but that they due to control rights would prefer debt (Aghion, et al., 2004, pp. 284-285).  
Bartoloni (2011) found that leverage decreased with profitability and alternative internal 
funding (i.e. retained earnings and equity capital) (Bartoloni, 2011, pp. 3-5, 12, 17), which 
implies dependence on external funding in the startup phase. Investing in intangible assets such 
as innovation decreases leverage, because successful innovation enhance self-funding through 
internal finances. Starting up an innovative company does not generate economic returns for a 
long time, making them dependent on external funding. Her study found that innovative SMEs 
relied more on internal funding and short-term debt than larger companies did  (Bartoloni, 2011, 
p. 34) . Thus, getting involved in innovation has less impact on capital structure for SMEs than 
larger firms.  
5.2 Sources of Funding 
The credit side of the balance sheet is constituted of equity and various forms of debt. The credit 
side will fund the debit side in the balance sheet, thus the credit side represent sources of 
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financing. This subsection seeks to present possible sources of funding for SMEs and 
entrepreneurs and possible obstacles with acquiring funds from these sources. There are many 
possible sources. I chose to focus on the key sources relevant for this paper: equity, debt, venture 
capital and government programs. It should nevertheless be mentioned that loans from friends 
and family and trade credit plays an important role in funding innovative startups (SMEs) and 
entrepreneurs.  
5.2.1 Equity 
Common stock, often referred to as equity, represents the ownership share in a company. The 
stockholders’ return is based on the performance of the company. Equity investors receive 
dividends based on retained earnings. Common stock have two important characteristics; (i) 
residual claim and (ii) limited liabilities. Residual claim means that the stakeholders are the last 
in line in claiming assets and income in cases of default bankruptcies, while limited liabilities 
implies that most investors can not lose more than their original investment in case of failure45 
(Bodie, et al., 2014, pp. 4,42). Because of limited liabilities, shareholders can be viewed as 
having a call option on the company. Structured as in Figure 7 below, the kink in the curve 
represents the amount of debt equal to the value of the company. With increased company 
value, the value of the shares increase, whereas for company value lower than debt value, the 
company has to hand over assets to repay debt, but the shareholders will only lose their original 
investment (Bodie, et al., 2014, p. 707).   
Figure 7: Equity as a Call Option 
 
Source: (Bodie, et al., 2014, p. 707) 
Equity is a composition of paid-in capital and retained earnings. In the startup phase, owners 
must invest equity in the company, thus attracting risk. Retained earnings are returns reinvested 
                                                          
45 Not the case for unincorporated companies where creditors can claim personal assets in case of failure. 
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in the company. Hall (2002) found that retained earnings is a preferred funding source for 
innovative firms because it is less costly than issuing new equity (Hall, 2002, p. 13). To be able 
to use retained earnings imply that the company already have revenue generating activities, 
which removes it as an option for funding for startups and entrepreneurs. 
The alternative to existing equity is issuing new shares, implying acquiring new capital in the 
equity market. The consequence of share issuing is more capital, but a dilution of existing 
shares. 
As discussed for banks issuing equity for the purpose of increasing capital ratio, there are issues 
with accessing the equity market.  As in the banking sector, the presence of asymmetric 
information is a problem in financing innovation companies. An entrepreneur usually has better 
information about their project idea and the likelihood of success than investors do. Therefore, 
the market for innovation investment is a “lemons” market.  
Asymmetric information is especially present in research, development, and innovation. The 
idea is the base for the entire company and so reducing information asymmetry via fuller 
disclosure is not an option in this arena, due to the ease of imitation of inventive ideas. Firms 
are reluctant to reveal their ideas, because there could be considerable costs related to revealing 
information to their competitors. Hence, the insinuation of asymmetric information combined 
with the possible costs of reducing the problem, is that innovative firms and entrepreneurs will 
face higher cost of external capital due to the lemons problem (Hall, 2002, pp. 7-9) 
Another issue surfacing when issuing equity is moral hazard. Separation of ownership and 
management leads to a possible principal-agent problem, where the goals of the owner 
(investors) differ from the goals of the manager (entrepreneur). Investors seek to maximize their 
investment, while the entrepreneurs might have other visions for their idea that do not necessary 
maximize shareholder value. Differences in willingness to attract risk is another problem. 
Innovation investment is generally risky because no one knows how the market will react to the 
new products, and there might not even be a market yet.   
Entrepreneurs might be more willing to take risks to realize their ideas, whereas investors are 
more concerned with getting returns on their investments. Although moral hazard problems 
occur in non-innovative companies as well, in case of investing in entrepreneurs and innovative 
SMEs investors have a capitalistic view, while idea holder might see other gains as more 
important (Hall, 2002, pp. 9-11).  
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5.2.2 Debt 
Debt is external capital borrowed over a period of time under a set of conditions and 
requirements for return i.e. interest rates. Debt comes in different forms. Most common is bank 
financing through a loan. Banks provide loans with different maturity and restrictions 
dependent on the borrower. Another debt form is money market debt or debt securities e.g. 
various versions of corporate bonds, which is a loan directly from the public (Bodie, et al., 
2014, p. 39).  
In the same manner as equity, debt can be viewed as a put option, see Figure 8. The kink in the 
debt curve represents the value of the debt as part of the company value. The debt holder will 
not receive more returns than the value of the debt plus interest, but in contradiction to equity 
there is a downside risk. The downside risk represent the case when company value falls below 
debt value. In such a case, the lenders will not reclaim the outstanding claim.    
Figure 8: Debt as a Put Option 
 
 
Source: (Bodie, et al., 2014, p. 707) 
Debt owners usually do not have voting rights like equity holders, which make them less able 
to influence the decision-making of the company. Thus, creditors often require collateral. Banks 
and debt holders prefer to use physical assets to secure loans because of the downside risk, 
which makes them reluctant to invest in innovative projects with intangible assets, such as 
human capital and knowledge. In addition, research have found that the sunk cost associated 
with innovation is higher than other investments (Hall, 2002, pp. 13-14). This supports the 
findings of Chavis, Klepper and Love (2010), who found that too high collateral requirements 
was one of the reasons for not applying for a bank loan, and for younger firms the main source 
of collateral was the owners’ personal assets (Chavis, et al., 2010, p. 3).    
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Servicing debt normally requires a stable generation of cash flow, which in case of innovative 
projects is not necessarily available in the early stages of the process. Even though the problems 
of asymmetric information and moral hazard  are present in both bank lending and money 
market resulting in higher required rate of return and collateral, revealing information to a bank 
does not have the same risk of imitation by competitors. The probability of a bank stealing or 
copying an innovative idea is close to zero, thus the asymmetric information problem is smaller 
in bank funding and more related to the banks’ lack of knowledge about the industry or 
innovation product.  
5.2.3 Government Funding and Venture Capital 
Government authorities realize the importance of new and innovative firms, thus they have 
created government-funding programs e.g. Small Business Investment Company (US) and 
Innovation Norway. The purpose of these programs is to allocate funds to SMEs involved in 
innovation and high technology, and function as guarantors for loans to small businesses.  
Lerner (1999) found significantly higher growth for SMEs in the Small Business Innovation 
Research program than similar companies outside the program (Hall, 2002, p. 24). An 
explanation is that the government involvement functions as a verification of the firms’ quality, 
thus they are able to access additional funds from private sources.  
The Venture capital market is often viewed as the solution to the void in innovation financing 
or the free market solution to the problem of financing innovation (Hall, 2002, p. 23). The 
structures of these companies differ on a country-to-country basis. Venture capital is seed 
capital, thus an equity investment.  Usually it consists of pools of funds from private investors, 
which are managed and invested in by individuals with knowledge about the industry. The 
theoretical background is based on investors being knowledgeable about the investments and 
the industry, thereby reducing the lemons problem. An upside of venture capital is that the 
venture capitalists can contribute to the company with competence and active ownership, which 
in turn reduces moral hazard.  It is a hands-on investment form, giving the investors better 
knowledge and influence on the decision-making and development of the company in 
contradiction to bank lending.  
The downside is that venture capital funding tends to be procyclical, but it is hard to determine 
whether the supply of funding causes growth or growth encourages funding. Consequently, in 
times of credit crunches and the need for alternative credit is highest, access to venture capital 
is also reduced (Hall, 2002, p. 24). In addition, as mentioned in the background section, use of 
venture capital geographically limited. Access to this kind of capital tend to be clustered in 
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areas e.g. Silicon Valley, which limits the number of companies with access to this form of 
funding.   
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
Modigliani and Miller’s theorem (1958) states that capital structure is irrelevant for funding 
costs, which then turns out not to be the case. Innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs using equity 
as their main source of funding are more profitable and experience a higher growth, which 
implies that the choice of funding is sensitive to the expected rate of return. That is, investors 
supplying funds for these types of companies require higher returns to compensate for the risk 
of a “lemon”, which makes it a more expensive source of funding (Hall, 2002, pp. 13-14).  
Empirical studies on capital structure for SMEs, entrepreneurs and innovation suggests that 
these companies rely more on alternative funding compared to other companies. Despite that 
fact, bank lending is their major source of funding. The relatively more intense use of alternative 
funding might be related to the costs of and access to standard funding sources. The presence 
of either asymmetric information or principal-agent problems imply that new debt or equity 
finance will be relatively more expensive for innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs. The problem 
with asymmetric information is bigger in equity financing due to unwillingness to share 
information in fear of imitation, but risk perception about the industry due to lack of knowledge 
contributes to stricter credit standards in bank lending46. In addition, other considerations, such 
as lack of collateral, further reduce the possibility of debt finance.   
Possible reasons for the observed capital structure is that the construction of taxation and size 
of asymmetric information problems indeed are favoring debt. Interest rate expenses are tax-
deductible, while dividend payments are not. In combination with a smaller risk of imitation 
related to revealing information to a bank, which reduces the asymmetric information problem 
and thus the required rate of return, debt seems like a cheaper funding option. This theory is 
supported by Aurebach (1984), who finds that due to taxation, the cost of financing new 
investments through debt is cheaper than by retained earnings, which is again cheaper than 
issuing new shares (Hall, 2002, pp. 13-14) .  
 
 
                                                          
46 Figure 4. 
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6. Analysis 
This section of the paper seeks to address the main issues of the paper: How will the impacts of 
Basel III on bank lending affect SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to funding? And second, How 
will these changes effect expected economic growth? 
As discussed previously, there are many sources of funding for innovative SMEs and 
entrepreneurs, but there are also several difficulties with gaining access to funding from these 
sources. In addition, bank lending is a key source of funding, implying access to bank credit is 
essential for the development and survival of innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs. Hence,  the 
issue to be analyzed further is how the Basel III regulations will affect the access to bank- and 
financial institution credit for SMEs and entrepreneurs and second, how this will impact the 
potential for economic growth.  
6.1 Current Situation and Recent Development in SME Lending and Credit 
Conditions 
Economic growth came to a halt in 2012 after a slight recovery. After the financial crisis of 
2007-2009, the world economies fell into a recession in 2011-2012.  Both inflationary pressure 
and demand fell (OECD, 2014, pp. 28-29). SMEs experienced a double shock: (i) a credit 
crunch and (ii) a fall in demand for their goods. Studies on SME finances in the period of 2007-
2011 suggest a degeneration in the financial situation for SMEs in most countries. While there 
has been a recovery to some extent, the levels are far beyond  pre-crisis levels. In addition, 
implementation of Basel III was expected to have a significant impact on SME lending and 
credit conditions (ABD and OECD, 2014, pp. 14-21).  
The recovery in both economic growth and lending to SMEs varies widely across countries. 
The Euro area is considered particularly unstable due to weakly capitalized banks, public debt 
financing requirements and exit risks. The monetary easing in response to the financial crisis 
did not have the wanted effects. The flow of credit to the private sector remained low. Concerns 
about public debt pushed yields on government bonds up. In addition, many corporate bonds 
and loans will fall due in 2013 and 2014, causing the increased supply to put an upward pressure 
on corporate bond yield. This indirectly increase cost of bank loans, because it resulted in 
increased cost of funding for banks, which they shared with the customers through increased 
interests (Angelkort & Stuwe, 2011, pp. 17-19). Banks holding sovereign bonds form high debt 
counties in their balance sheets experienced refinancing difficulties. In addition, a deterioration 
of balance sheet positions due to the distressed financial environment and increasing credit 
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losses lowered the banks capacity and willingness to provide credit to the private sector (OECD, 
2014, pp. 28-29). These effects comply with the procyclical effect banks tend to have. 
The observations from the credit supply side comply with the observations on the demand side. 
Survey findings by ECB and OECD suggests a further supply restriction in the provisions of 
loans made 15% of SMEs that applied for a loan  in 2011-2012, got their application rejected, 
which is the highest since late 2009. The response suggested some cases of increased interest 
rates, but the major obstacle was increased demand for collateral. The availability improved in 
2012, implying improvement in financial market confidence and in banks’ funding conditions. 
The problems lasted longer in Europe, where one third of SMEs did not get the full funding 
they were planning on, and worsened conditions in 2013 (OECD, 2014, pp. 38-39).  
6.1.1 Changes in SMEs Access to Funding 
As mentioned in the previous section, SMEs have limited choices when it comes to forms of 
financing. SMEs are more dependent on debt financing than larger firms. The narrow set of 
financing sources makes them more vulnerable to changing conditions in credit markets. A 
decline in SME loans implies that the credit market allocated a smaller share of funding to 
SMEs. However, this can also be a result of changing trends in financing opportunities for larger 
firms. Hence, the observed trends can reflect a general contraction in bank lending indicating 
that larger firms are resorting to other forms of finance. The same can be applied to the opposite 
case. An increase in SME lending can be due to an increase in total volume, implying no change 
in the share of SMEs relative to larger firms. Figure 9 shows that SMEs make up more than 
90% of total enterprises in both the OECD and ABD area, which makes it reasonable to 
conclude that the lower share of SME loans to total loans can not be explained by number of 
SMEs to larger companies. On the other hand, it also implies that the access to bank lending 
has been more limited for SMEs than larger firms.  
To get a representative picture of the development in lending behavior towards SMEs, one have 
to compare the shares of SME lending relative to larger enterprises and the change in total 
lending volume (OECD, 2014, pp. 30-34). During 2007-2011, SME loans as share of total 
business loans increased in only four countries of the OECD scoreboard countries. This 
continued to be the case even in regions with positive SME loan growth, implying that total 
business loans were growing faster, increasing the gap in SME financing in many economies. 
Only a few economies reported an accelerated growth in SME financing, but these economies 
also had a growth in GDP, suggesting that to some extent the increased gap in SME financing 
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is correlated with the economic distress caused by the financial crisis (ABD and OECD, 2014, 
pp. 14-21).  
6.1.2 Changes in Credit Terms 
In most countries, the credit terms applied to SMEs were less favorable than for larger 
companies i.e. higher interest rates, shorter maturity and stricter requirements for collateral. 
Even countries experiencing improvement in SME lending experienced a tightening of credit 
conditions. It should be noted that the changes in conditions are complex to compare due to 
geographical differences. 
The tightening of collateral requirements was observed not only in SME lending, but also in 
other markets i.e. haircuts on securities in the financial sector. Thus, the tightening applied to 
SMEs in isolation cannot explain if the increased credit standards are related to risk evaluation 
of SMEs, or a general increased perception of risk. Thus, credit standards has to be measured 
in relative terms. With some exceptions, the majority of SMEs were required to provide 
increased collateral to back their loans. The increase was mostly unified across country borders 
between 2010 and 2012. An explanation may be the decrease in value of the underlying assets 
used as collateral. With a decrease in asset value, increased requirements are reasonable to keep 
the collateral coverage intact (OECD, 2014, pp. 36-37).  
After a slight ease in 2010, the conditions were tightened in 2011 because of increased 
awareness of credit risk associated with loans (ABD and OECD, 2014, pp. 14-21). However, 
the availability to funding seems more relevant to SMEs than the cost of funding. The OECD 
scoreboard (2014) finds that the perception of access to funding was worsened in 2011 and 
2012, leading to the assumption that there were cash flow constraints (OECD, 2014, pp. 36-
37). In contradiction, IFO (2011) reports that 24% of enterprises complain about restricted 
lending, which is amongst the lowest percentage since this statistic began to be recorded –  
implying there was no bottleneck in business lending. Angelkort and Stuwe (2011) states that 
during and after the crisis, decentralized credit institutions were able to ensure stability in SME 
financing (Angelkort & Stuwe, 2011, pp. 17-19).  
Despite a downward trend in interests due to quantitative easing in 2011, an increase in nominal 
interest rates charged to SMEs insinuate an upward trend in cost of funding for SMEs. In some 
countries, the increase in nominal interests resulted from the precarious situation regarding 
government debt. In half of the countries studied in the OECD scoreboard, the increase in 
nominal interests was complemented with a remarkable increase in interest spreads between 
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loans for SMEs and large companies implying a deteriorated perception of risk associated with 
SME lending (ABD and OECD, 2014, pp. 14-21).  
6.1.3 Changes in Access to Equity Capital 
The financial crisis also affected the market for equity capital, resulting in an acute decline in 
venture and growth capital in 2008-2009, supporting the procyclical behavior of venture 
capitalists. The recovery varied from country to country, but a large number of the sample 
countries47 averaged around 5% of total financing. Consequently suggesting that the precarious 
economic climate functioned as a damper on equity investment (ABD and OECD, 2014, pp. 
14-21). Despite this reality, public and private co-investments in venture capital programs and 
government funding and regulatory changes have had positive effects on stimulating equity 
investments in many countries during and after the financial crisis (OECD, 2014, pp. 39-40).  
6.1.4 Changes in Trends 2013 
As Figure 9 shows figures form 2013. There were some differences in both trends and policies 
between the OECD and ADB48. With regards to bank lending, the share of SME loans was 30%-
40% for the OECD and a bit lower for ADB. The annual growth in loans to SMEs ranged 
between zero and 10%, which indicates a modest growth. These findings are albeit consistent 
with the OECD Scoreboard (2014), but the scoreboard takes into account that the growth is 
stronger in countries who did not experience a credit contradiction in 2007-2009, while the 
growth is negative in the countries that where hit the hardest. Invested growth and venture 
capital has marginally increased since 2007. The biggest regional differences are observed in 
relation to policy responses. The share of countries with direct lending and refinancing schemes, 
was less than 30% for OECD, while 90%-100% for the ADB area. The share of countries with 
public guarantee schemes in OECD was 50%-70%, while 70%-90% for the ABD. The 
differences in these indicators emphasize the problem with comparing effects across country 
borders, infrastructural differences in capital markets and access to alternative funding. Even 
though invested venture capital seems to be similar, the government involvement has significant 
impact on access to alternative funding.  When it comes to tax incentive schemes, less than 30% 
                                                          
47 From the OECD and ADB study.  
48 ABD= 14 developing member countries of Asian Development Bank: Bangladesh, Cambodia, People’s 
Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the 
Philippines, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam.   
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of the OECD counties had such schemes for SMEs. In the ADB area, the same share was 30%-
50%.  
 Figure 9: Trends in SME Finance and Policies in ADB and OECD (2013)* 
 
 
*Based on data from ABD Asia SME Finance Monitor 2013 and the OECD Scoreboard 2013. 
Source: (ABD and OECD, 2014, p. 22) 
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6.2 What to Expect for SME Lending and Credit Conditions After the 
Implementation of Basel III 
In an economic upturn, the dependence on bank loans has not been as significant of an issue for 
SMEs and entrepreneurs. However, due to struggles with recovering to pre-crisis economic 
growth levels and debt consolidation, the volumes are not expected to bounce back to pre-crisis 
levels in the near future. Based on the empirical results and discussions in section 6.1, it is 
reasonable to conclude that SMEs and entrepreneurs access to bank lending and the credit 
conditions applied to their loans is correlated with the economic situation. Since it has already 
been made clear that bank lending is procyclical, this conclusion is quite obvious. The 
interesting part is that it seems that banks’ procyclical behavior affects lending to SMEs and 
entrepreneurs to a wider extent than larger firms.  
A probable cause is the perception of risk associated with innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs. 
As Figure 4 showed, the major factor for the credit standard tightening in 2012 and beginning 
of 2013 is the perceived risk. The evaluation of risk related to business cycles is not directly 
related to Basel III, but when calculating required regulatory capital, banks use the probability 
of default (PD) in IRB approaches to measure risk exposures. Underpinned by the results from 
OECD scoreboard (2014), the number of bankruptcies and delays in payments increased during 
and after the financial crisis (OECD, 2014, p. 1), due to a fall in demand for goods and a credit 
crunch, causing a reduction in cash flows.  
The access to alternative funding also evaporated. Despite government involvement in reducing 
the repercussions, the buildup of government debt reduced their ability to provide guarantees 
and direct lending. In combination with the procyclical behavior of venture capitalists, it is 
reasonable to expect an increase in PD for SMEs and entrepreneurs. In a recession or a crisis, 
the lack of financing sources and fall in demand for goods, which reduces turnover, makes 
survival of innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs less likely than larger established firms. Banks 
apply interest premiums to reflect and protect themselves from the risk associated with the 
investment.  With increased probability of default, a tightening of credit standard is expected. 
This is supported by calculations and observations of Cardone-Ripotella, Trujillo-Ponce and 
Briozzo (2011). They examine effects of Basel II and Basel III on required capital and risk 
premiums for SME lending. Their research is based on Spanish SMEs, and they found that the 
average PD from 2005-2007 was 3.07%, while it increased to 5.47% in 2008 and further to 
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7.55% in 200949 (Cardone-Riportella, et al., 2011, pp. 9-10). Consequently, there is an indirect 
relationship between the effects of Basel III and economic environment.  
As described briefly in section 3.2 there are two approaches to measuring risk weights. The 
standard approach is done by an independent rating company, while the IRB approach is based 
on internal calculations of exposures to risk for different classes of assets. The IRB approach is 
more risk sensitive. Innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs tap in to new markets with no previous 
analysis of demand or probability of success. In addition, they do not generate cash flows 
immediately and (usually) have a predominance of intangible assets relative to real assets. All 
these factors imply that SME lending is a riskier investment than lending to an established, 
larger firm, thus it is reasonable to conclude that they have a higher PD  than other enterprises. 
Although the PD increases in an economic recession or a crisis, the conclusion is independent 
of the economic environment. Inevitably, tighter credit standards are applied to SMEs and 
entrepreneurs, amplifying their financing difficulties through a raise in cost of funding.  
In analyzing the pure regulatory effects of Basel III on capital requirements, I have disregarded 
the economic environment effects on PD for the first part of the analysis. 
6.2.1 Effects of Increased Required Regulatory Capital  
The IRB approach is not a new method in Basel III, but the stricter requirements for capital 
coverage and quality of regulatory capital changes the evaluation of the profitability of a loan. 
Cardone-Ripotella, Trujillo-Ponce and Briozzo (2011) calculated the changes in required 
regulatory capital due to the new requirements imposed by Basel III for Spain50. Their 
calculations take into account all new requirements i.e. increased minimum capital coverage, 
liquidity requirements and leverage ratio. They also include the firm size adjustment introduced 
in Basel II.  
As mentioned, banks can either classify SMEs as corporate exposures or as part of a retail 
portfolio. The latter results in calculating exposures the same way as for other retail exposures 
or as part of a retail portfolio in compliance with the SME compromise, which will be discussed 
below. The firm size adjustment explained in section 3.2.1.1 has a positive effect for SMEs as 
long as their sales exceed €6 million. Exposure to SMEs is the sum of corporate or retail 
                                                          
49 The numbers apply to Spanish companies, thus they are not representative for PD internationally, but the trend 
development reflect the changes in PD one expects to see in times of financial crisis.  
50 It should be noted that the numbers from the calculations apply only to Spain, but the trend development is 
applicable to a general interpretation of the effects Basel III have. 
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exposure and the firm size adjustment. As long as the sales exceed €6 million, the firm size 
adjustment is negative, thus reducing exposure. This is supported by Saurina and Trucharte 
(2004) who found that the firm-size adjustment reduced PD both for the standard and IRB 
approach (Cardone-Riportella, et al., 2011, p. 7).  
In the case of Spain, the results of the calculations was that the required regulatory capital for 
SMEs as retail exposure was 3.925% and 7.36% for SMEs as corporate exposure under Basel 
II. Under Basel III the exposures increased to 5.153% and 9.66%51 respectively (Cardone-
Riportella, et al., 2011, pp. 13-14). This development due to the regulative provisions imposed 
by Basel III suggest that lending to SMEs and entrepreneurs will be more expensive for banks, 
because Basel III requires higher levels of regulatory capital in comparison to the requirements 
under Basel II. Albeit under the assumption that equity capital is expensive and increased equity 
to debt ratio increases total cost of funding as equation (8) in section 4.1.2 suggests. This 
argument, in compliance with the discussed theory of the bank-lending channel, points to 
reduced lending to SMEs and entrepreneurs as a consequence of the Basel III provisions, but it 
is not necessary a fact.  
The access to funding is indirectly affected by the cost of funding. The cost of funding 
determines if it is at all achievable to make use of a possible funding source. Due to asymmetric 
information, an external financier requires higher returns than one would require of one self. 
An outside party has less information about an individual’s or a company’s creditworthiness, 
therefore an additional premium to compensate for this bias in information is required. The 
asymmetric information related to innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs is discussed in both 
section 4 and 5, and in relation to bank lending one of the main problems is the lack of industry 
knowledge from the bank’s side. In addition, uncertainty related to industry or economic 
development and future gives rise for a risk premium.  
Cardone-Ripotella, Trujillo-Ponce and Briozzo (2011) calculates the changes in credit risk 
premiums (CRP) after implementation of Basel III. They calculate credit risk premiums as the 
sum of expected loss (EL) and opportunity cost of the regulatory capital. The inclusion of 
opportunity cost of regulatory capital is because in case of default the bank will not only 
experience losses  related to the loan amount, but also the earnings they could have made on 
the equity capital by not tying it up. The bank could for example invest their equity capital in a 
less risky asset and get a safe return on their investment (ROE). Hence, the opportunity cost of 
                                                          
51 See Appendix 6, Tables 11-14 for assumptions and more detailed calculations. 
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capital is the capital requirement (CR) * return on equity (ROE). Expected loss is by definition 
the product of PD and loss given default (LGD). Hence, 
(10) 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷 + 𝐶𝑅 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸  
(Cardone-Riportella, et al., 2011, p. 19) 
The PD is dependent on the risk related to the borrower, which I have already determined is 
higher for innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs due to industry specific factors. The LGD is 
related to several factors including the lending volume. As discussed in previous sections, the 
CR is higher under Basel III. While Cardone-Ripotella, Trujillo-Ponce and Briozzo used a 
constant ROE equal to the average ROE in Spain (in 2011), one can argue that ROE is variable. 
The actual ROE is dependent on the profitability of the bank, while required ROE by 
shareholders is dependent on their perception of risk related to the bank. Assumingly a higher 
equity to debt ratio reduces the required return on equity because the volatility of equity is 
reduced and the financial structure is less risky, in compliance with Vale (2011). Shareholders 
are the last in line for collecting their investment in case of default or bankruptcy, thus a bank 
with high leverage would expect the equity holders to require a higher return on their 
investment.  The increased requirements for capital could therefor reduce ROE and in second 
turn, this would reduce the credit risk premium.  
The calculations of CRP for Spain are presented in Table 15 in Appendix 6 and shows that the 
CRP is higher under Basel III than Basel II.  The discussion in the previous section suggests 
not only that the CRP will be higher for SMEs than larger firms, but also that due to the increase 
in CR; Basel III contribute to an increase in CPR in general (Cardone-Riportella, et al., 2011, 
pp. 18-19). However, because the PD for SMEs and entrepreneurs is higher than for larger 
enterprises the CRP applied to SMEs and entrepreneurs is expected to be higher, see equation 
(10). 
For Banks, their current level of regulatory capital limits the growth of lending if new capital 
is not acquired, because expanding the balance sheet with new loans requires regulatory capital 
coverage. As discussed, Basel III results in increased required regulatory capital, which implies 
that even given an unchanged balance sheet, a bank might have to raise new capital. The price 
of new capital and frictions in equity capital markets will to some extent limit the accessibility 
to acquire new regulatory capital. In addition, assuming the calculations by Vale (2011) holds, 
the cost of funding for banks will increase. Theory for the bank-lending channel suggests that 
the effect will be a reduction in lending. Given that lending to SMEs and entrepreneurs presents 
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a larger exposure to risk and thus requires more regulatory capital, which entails an acquisition 
costs, it is reasonable to assume that SME lending will be reduced relative to lending to larger 
firms.  
Another aspect to consider is the size of banks. Large banks are often considered too big to fail 
which makes it easier to use the equity capital markets. The frictions in this market described 
in section 4.2.1 are more limited for large banks, because the government indirectly guarantees 
them. The government guarantee reduces the asymmetric information problem and the 
probability of investors losing their invested capital, hence they are more willing to invest and 
require lower returns on their investment. In the case of issuing new equity, the required return 
on capital is higher for the intermediary banks such as saving banks, cooperative banks and 
private bankers. These banks are usually those who concentrate on SME and entrepreneur 
financing. These banks have to cover increased capital requirements in the first instance through 
retained earnings (Angelkort & Stuwe, 2011, p. 11). This has a negative impact on SMEs and 
entrepreneurs because banks with high engagement in SME and entrepreneur lending face a 
higher cost of funding through the equity market. Their dependency on retained earnings and 
relatively higher costs of addressing the equity capital market limits access to regulatory capital, 
thus the increase in capital requirement presents a bottleneck in SME and entrepreneur lending.  
The alternative to acquiring new capital is to change the balance sheet, either its size or 
structure.  The changes in Basel III related to risk assessments of trading book positions and 
securitizations seem to be in favor of SMEs and entrepreneurs, because provisions for the risk-
weights applied to corporate loans did not change, while exposures to more innovative 
instruments, such as trading book assets and securitizations did. This means that even though 
SMEs and entrepreneurs attract higher risk weights relative to larger firms, they are 
theoretically preferable in relation to trading book positions and securitizations for the purpose 
of reducing total balance sheet risk exposure (Angelkort & Stuwe, 2011, pp. 15-17). Whether 
banks in reality would prefer SME and entrepreneur loans or trading book positions and 
securitizations is albeit another case. 
The SME compromise requires a 6% backing of SME loans in the retail portfolio. The 
unchanged risk-weight measurements for corporations might be in favor of SME relative to 
trading book positions and securitizations. However, by only adjusting minimum capital and 
not the related risk weights, it causes an increase in the required backing for the SME loans in 
the portfolio, which implies a risk weight increase relative to that applied under Basel II 
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(Angelkort & Stuwe, 2011, pp. 12-13). This would reduce the intended purpose of the SME 
compromise. An increase in the risk weight applied to the portfolio and hence result in higher 
required regulatory capital leading to the same mechanisms discussed in the previous 
paragraphs. 
Loans guaranteed by government programs or banks like Lending Guarantee Associations will 
under the Basel accords result in a reduction of the need of backing, relative to those 
collateralized by assets. That is, in case of a guarantor for SME and entrepreneur loans, such as 
the government programs provide, the risk weight applied to the SME and entrepreneur 
exposure is equal to the exposure to the guarantor. It is a fair to assume that the PD of the 
guarantor is lower than the borrowing SME and entrepreneur, because guarantors for innovative 
SMEs and entrepreneurs are usually governments, either directly or through government 
initiatives, and large associations. Thus the presence of a guarantors  affects both the EL, 
required regulatory capital and CPR, but to what amount is dependent on the evaluation of PD 
and LGD for the guarantor. Cardone-Ripotella, Trujillo-Ponce and Briozzo’s calculations 
support this. The CRP is still higher under Basel III than Basel II, suggesting a guarantor will 
reduce the cost of funding for SMEs and entrepreneurs, but that Basel III still imposes an 
increase in the CPR relative to the old provisions (Cardone-Riportella, et al., 2011, pp. 20-24).  
Going back to the first paragraphs of this section, SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to funding 
is highly dependent on the economic environment. Basel III contributes to a stable financial 
market, hence a stable economic environment. The IRB approach uses the PD to calculate risk 
weights applied to the borrower, thus the required regulatory capital. As discussed the PD is 
perceived as higher for innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs, relative to larger firms. In general, 
a stable economic environment reduces PD, implying that a stable economic environment could 
contribute to ease of access to funding for SMEs and entrepreneurs.  
Even though the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical capital buffer increase the 
required regulatory capital, which seemingly has a negative effect on bank lending to SMEs 
and entrepreneurs, they contribute to less procyclical behavior from the banks. The banks will 
have to build up the buffers in good times, which implies less lending in good times. However, 
when the buffer is removed in bad times, banks have additional built up capital beyond the 
amount regulations require, contributing to sustain lending levels in times of distress. 
Consequently, this results in more stable access to funding for SMEs and entrepreneurs. A 
secondary effect of stable access to funding may be less defaults and bankruptcies in a recession 
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or a crisis. If the latter effect occurs, it would lead to a reduction in PD for SMEs and 
entrepreneurs, which implies reduction in required regulatory capital for these loans and a 
reduction in CRP applied to SMEs and entrepreneurs. This positive long-term effect is 
dependent on the buffer being predictable for the banks; otherwise, it would impose an 
additional risk element viewing the buffer as a shock for banks. On the other hand, predictability 
limits the supervisory government’s flexibility to make decisions. Despite the governments’ 
preferred flexibility, the regulations state that the buffer should be added in times of excessive 
credit growth; hence, banks can evaluate the market, leading to predictability to some extent.  
In addition, Basel III seeks to improve the competitive conditions to achieve more equalized 
international competition. Figure 4 showed that competition is one of the major factors for the 
reduction in credit standards after the third quarter in 2012. One can not argue that the causal 
effect for the increased competition is Basel regulations. However, if Basel III evens out 
internationally competitive conditions, thus toughening the competition, the trend in Figure 4 
might continue – easing the credit standards, also for SMEs and entrepreneurs.  
6.2.2 The Effects of Liquidity Requirements 
The banking industry has made several objections to the NSFR. The major argument is that the 
NSFR would require substantial and expensive changes to how they fund themselves and invest 
in assets, with little safety to be gained (Elliot, 2010). Following the ideal setup for adjustments 
to the liquidity regulations suggested by the Basel Committee in “An assesment of the long-
term economic impact of stronger capital and liquidity requirements”, that might be the case.  
A bank holding high liquid assets (e.g. deposits and government bonds and –securities) could 
be viewed as liquid despite of funding with short-term maturities because assets could easily be 
liquidated to absorb a potential loss of funding. Banks holding less liquid assets rely more on 
long term funding, because the assets can not cover loss of funding as fast (Elliot, 2010). Thus, 
a bank does not necessary have to change their source of funding if they have high liquid assets. 
The downside is that high liquid assets are assets that can be converted fast and do not decrease 
in value in times of distress, usually such assets yields lower returns, putting pressure on 
margins and hence revenues (Angelkort & Stuwe, 2011, p. 9). To maintain their profitability, it 
is reasonable to argue that the banks seek profits other places, such as margins on loans. As 
discussed, SMEs and entrepreneurs attract higher risk premiums on their loans. An additional 
increase due to liquidity requirements imposed by Basel III suggests an increase in cost of 
funding in addition to the increase resulting from the capital requirements. This does not 
directly affect the access of funding in absolute terms, as a reduction in lending would, but the 
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ability to access funding is dependent on the cost. Thus, the liquidity requirements are not in 
favor of SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to funding.  
If the banks has less liquid assets, they would then have to resort to more expensive stable 
funding, such as corporate deposits and non-bank and non-financial funding, the cost of funding 
increases. Increased cost of funding may translate into higher interest rates or reduction in 
lending in compliance with the bank-lending channel.    
Another aspect is that in some cases, the restructuring of funding and substitution of assets 
might not be enough. If that is the case, the banks have to reduce their other assets. SME and 
entrepreneur loans are less liquid and more risky than other loans. The increased credit risk 
SMEs and entrepreneurs attract in times of financial or economic distress, reduces the loan 
value and investors willingness to buy them, thus they become less liquid. Other financial 
instruments might have higher risk, but compared to other loans it suggests a shift away from 
SME and entrepreneur lending. Whether a bank cuts back on SME and entrepreneur lending or 
other assets, such as trading book items and securitizations, depends on the preferred asset 
combination of the individual bank. 
Regarding the “little safety to be gained” argument, it is more disputable. In case of panic due 
to financial distress with capital flight, a less liquid bank would have severe problems 
converting assets to cover loss of capital, which would make them illiquid or in a worst-case 
scenario insolvent (Elliot, 2010). This is exactly what was seen during the recent financial crisis. 
It was hard to differentiate illiquid banks form insolvent banks, in addition, the value of the 
assets decreased, further worsening the liquidity situation. These qualities made it harder to 
access funding in the interbank- and money market and resulted in a credit crunch. 
Consequently, banks are dependent on strict liquidity supervision and management to prevent 
a fatal run on the bank when confidence in their financial strength evaporates. The credit crunch 
could cause spillover effects to the banks’ lending activities. If the banks can not access the 
inter-bank market, or are exposed to excessively high interest due to increase in liquidity- and 
credit risk, it would in compliance with the bank-lending channel lead to a reduction in lending.  
Looking solely at the liquidity requirement, it might have the effects just discussed. However, 
it is worth noting that changing the HQLA to total assets by reducing short-term funding and 
increasing the amount of HQLA reduce RWA. A reduction in RWA causes synergy effects 
with regards to required regulatory capital. These spillover effects can have a positive impact 
on SME and entrepreneur lending, because a decrease in RWA reduces required regulatory 
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capital needed for current assets leaving room for expanding the balance sheet with for example 
SME and entrepreneur loans. However, if and what kind of assets the bank chooses to expand 
their balance sheets with, again depends on the bank’s preferred balance sheet structure.  
6.2.3 The Effects of Leverage Requirements 
The purpose of imposing leverage requirements is to have a cross-check of the risk based 
approach. The leverage coverage is based on the amount of Tier 1 capital to the accounting 
balance sheet. It does not take in to account the riskiness of the balances sheet. This measure is 
to avoid the buildup of excessively large balance sheets. The leverage requirement is also 
disputed. First, because it is based on the accounting balance sheet and accounting regulations 
differ from country-to country. Hence, in reality, the measurement for leverage results in 
different coverage in different countries, which does not promote equal competition 
internationally. Second, the leverage requirements suggests a shift towards a smaller balance 
sheet, which means banks with large low risk balance sheets (as the capital requirements 
suggest) would have to hold more capital than banks with smaller high-risk balance sheets 
(Elliot, 2010).  Taking into account both the capital and leverage requirements, banks would 
have to resort to less risky and smaller balance sheets, both suggesting a reduction in revenues.   
The effect leverage requirements has on SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to lending is that the 
leverage requirement limits new business – unless new equity is issued. Expanding the balances 
sheet would require more Tier 1 capital. Since leverage does not take into account the risk, it 
does not differentiate SME and entrepreneur loans from other assets, thus leverage does not 
affect the access to funding for SMEs and entrepreneurs specifically, rather the total supply of 
credit.    
On the other hand, a reduction in total lending suggests a reduction in total access to funding, 
including for SMEs and entrepreneurs. The possible decrease in revenues due to a reduction of 
the balance sheet diminishes the profit of the bank, which could result in higher interest rates 
to compensate for lower profits, the same way as for the liquidity requirements. 
6.2.4 Effects on Alternative Funding 
Venture capital is procyclical and government involvement is limited in times of a crisis, 
because of increased government spending to curb the scope of the repercussions. This is not 
optimal for SMEs and entrepreneurs, because it is in such times, when banks hold back on 
credit, they need alternative sources of funding. Basel III attempts to smooth the fluctuations in 
the economy, hence reducing volatility in supply of both venture capital and government 
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contribution. Consequently, Basel III provides the possibility of more stable alternative 
funding. 
6.3 Effects on Economic Growth 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 caused a fall in GDP and reduced the forecasts for economic 
growth for most world economies, albeit to various extents. In addition, the path to recovery is 
an expensive process causing problems on its own, such as the European debt crisis.  A crisis 
has major impacts on economic growth and future growth opportunities, thus a crisis presents 
a substantial cost with permanent losses for an economy. The purpose of Basel III is to reduce 
the probability of a new crisis through a stable and robust financial system. There are no 
disagreements on the fact that Basel III provides exactly that. Based on this view, the Basel III 
regulation promotes, if not economic growth at the current time, the possibility of economic 
growth in the future.  
Recognizing the importance of financial stability, the secondary ramifications the Basel III 
regulations have on lending behavior might take the prospects of economic growth in another 
direction. Basel III will not reverse economic growth, but is expected to have a dampening 
effect on the pace of growth. Excessive growth is a contributing factor to a crisis, which is what 
Basel III is trying to reduce, but the question is how large of a reduction in growth is expected 
and acceptable. 
The expected slowdown in economic growth is related to higher credit costs and reduced credit 
availability. How much one would expect the economies to contract is dependent on how much 
interest rates increase and availability is reduced. One could argue that the gradual 
implementation of Basel III provides a cushion for the effects one expects to see, discussed 
above. A gradual implementation gives banks time to adapt to the changes necessary. Intuitively 
that gives room for making small adjustments at a time, so that the effects are not as extensive 
as sudden large changes. The same thing is observed in monetary and fiscal policy cycle 
adjustments (not including measures taken during a crisis, the scope of such policy during a 
crisis have objective of wider repercussions). Countercyclical policy measures are small and 
contribute to reduce fluctuations in the economy without excessive impact on the real economy. 
Figure 9 showed that in 2013, SMEs amounted more than 90% of all enterprises and employed 
60%-70% of the total number of employees in both the OEDC and ADB area. This implies that 
SMEs and entrepreneurs are crucial to economic growth as they make up a large part of the 
economy. The innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs are also the contributors that have most 
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value to add. Mature firms and industries have limited possibilities of increasing GDP and 
employment. Albeit they contribute to economic growth, but unless they invest in research and 
innovation, they contribute little to expanding the opportunities for increasing growth, thus 
causing a shift in economic trend growth. The innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs’ importance 
for economic growth could be and is disputed, but I will not discuss this further in this paper 
apart from mentioning that it is a factor one may consider. 
As long as the shift in economic growth trend is caused by use of untapped resources or 
increased effectivity through innovation and not excessive credit growth, the probability of a 
new crisis does not increase. Growth stemming from unnatural growth in prices due excessive 
credit growth leads to the creation of bubbles, which are not backed by a real increase in value. 
When these bubbles burst gets a recession or crisis, depending on "size" on the bubble. On the 
other hand, use of untapped resources or increased effectivity through innovation cause a real 
value increase, thus does not present the same risk of a crisis. This is a reason why SMEs and 
entrepreneurs are so important to economic growth, in addition to job creation and generation 
of GDP. 
The discussion in Section 6.2 suggests that Basel III will put more pressure on an already 
vulnerable situation, SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to financing. First, Basel III results in 
increased risk premiums to SMEs and entrepreneurs, thus increases their cost of funding. 
Second, access to funding seems to deteriorate through reduced lending. The presence of these 
effects will have a negative impact on economic growth, given that increase in growth is 
dependent on SMEs and entrepreneurs. 
On the other hand, the fact that SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to funding is so dependent on 
the economic situation, and Basel III contributes to a more stable economic situation over time, 
speaks in favor of the effects being temporary. One would expect a stable economic 
environment to increase the SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to both bank lending and 
alternative funding, making it reasonable to argue that the effects on economic growth might 
be negative at present time, but in the future it will have less dampening effect and possibly 
even a positive effect.   
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7. Conclusion  
SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to funding was already before the implementation of Basel III 
a problem in many economies. These enterprises have low cash flows in the startup phase, 
predominance of intangible assets, thus little collateral and high probability of default. Figure 
9 showed that despite of SMEs constituting 90 % of total companies, they hold under 40% of 
total loans in 2013, supporting this view.  
The main question of this thesis was “How will Basel III regulations affect SMEs and 
entrepreneurs’ access to funding?” Although predicting the consequences of Basel III 
concerning SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access to funding is hard to do at present time, the 
discussions in this paper have found some possible developments. The fact that not all countries 
are required to impose the Basel regulations on their financial and banking sector, as well as 
differences in current economic situation contributes to Basel III giving rise to divergence in 
the development of SME and entrepreneur lending geographically. Despite of this one would 
expect the implementation of Basel III to have a negative impact on SMEs and entrepreneurs’ 
access to bank lending. On the other hand, the discussion suggest that the negative impact will 
not necessarily persist. 
The analysis in section 6.2 found that the increase in required regulatory capital imposed by 
Basel III result in an increase in required capital for SME and entrepreneur loans. This implies 
an increased cost related to these loans relative to larger enterprise loans and the requirements 
under Basel II. Assuming there is a bank-lending channel the mechanisms of this cannel would 
result in a reduction in lending when the cost for the bank increases, suggesting a reduction in 
SME and entrepreneur loans relative to other loans. In addition, the cost of funding for SMEs 
and entrepreneurs will increase due to a raise in the credit risk premiums applied to these loans. 
Either directly related to the capital requirements and PD or indirectly through the liquidity- 
and leverage requirements. 
The arguments related to the liquidity requirements does not directly imply that liquidity will 
result in a reduction in the supply of bank lending. However, reduction in revenues due to 
increased cost of funding and a shift towards lower yielding assets, suggests a dampening effect 
on the growth of Tier 1 capital. Taking into account the required regulatory capital coverage, 
the banks’ ability to supply credit might be affected. The required regulatory capital for SME 
and entrepreneur loans increase under Basel III, implying that a curbing of Tier 1 capital growth 
may reduce SME and entrepreneur lending more than lending to larger enterprises.  
 
 
68 
 
In general, accessing funding is harder for innovative SMEs and entrepreneurs due to the 
uncertainty related to innovation and lack of tangible assets and early cash flow generation. 
However, analyzing the development of bank lending to SMEs and entrepreneurs in section 
6.1, I would conclude that the deterioration in SME and entrepreneur lending is to some degree 
related to the recent financial crisis. This supports the view that SMEs and entrepreneurs’ access 
to bank lending is highly dependent on the economic situation, even more than larger 
companies, because their access to funding, and probability of success or default, is more 
sensitive to economic fluctuations.  
Stability in the economy reduces the probability of default, because it reduces the probability 
of a negative demand shock and lack of financing. Thus, stability reduce in required regulatory 
capital for SME and entrepreneur lending, and credit risk premiums added. In addition, a 
reduction in economic fluctuations reduces the procyclical behavior of both banks and Venture 
capitalists, which ensures a more stable access to funding for SMEs and entrepreneurs. Further, 
these arguments leads to the conclusion that, if Basel III provides a stable economy, the access 
to funding for SMEs and entrepreneurs will improve. 
The secondary issue of this thesis was “How will these changes effect expected economic 
growth?” As studies and this thesis analysis suggests, the introduction of Basel III will cause a 
slowdown in economic growth. SMEs and entrepreneurs are, as emphasized, an essential 
contribution to growth. The potential of increasing value added to the economy exceeds that of 
mature enterprises. Thus, securing access to finance for SMEs and entrepreneurs is key to future 
growth. In a short-term perspective, Basel III will restrain access to funding for SMEs and 
entrepreneurs and hence put a dampening effect on economic growth. The long-term impact on 
economic growth is harder to determine. However, it is reasonable to conclude that if Basel III 
causes a more stable economic environment, consequently the regulation contributes to more 
continuous access to funding for SMEs and entrepreneurs. With more stable access to funding 
SMEs and entrepreneurs can contribute to economic growth to a larger scale than today. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the long-term effects will be improvement of 
prospects for economic growth.  
7.1 Perspectives 
The implementation of Basel III will not be complete until 2019. Hence, conditions and 
surroundings will change until then. In addition, the framework is under continuous evaluation 
and opens for adjustments. Regardless, to secure a stable, robust economy without 
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compromising possibilities of innovation, regulatory authorities have to balance financial- 
stability and inclusion with comprehensive risk assessments against unexpected events.  
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Appendix 1 – Basel I 
 
Capital Definitions 
Types of capital qualified to contribute to Tier 2 capital for the purpose of calculating capital 
coverage ratio under The Basel regulations. The same types of capital function as Tier 2 
capital under Basel II and Basel III, but with some additional restrictions related to the use of 
Internal Ratings Based approaches.  
Tier 2- Supplementary Capital 
1. Undisclosed Reserves 
Undisclosed reserves include reserves that have passed through the profit and loss 
account undisclosed, but accepted by the bank in question’s supervisory authority. The 
reserves could be of the same inherent quality as the published retained earnings, but in 
an international setting, the absence of transparency and distinctive national regulations 
for these type of reserves, they are not included in Tier 1.  
2. Revaluation Reserves 
For some countries, their national regulations allow for valuing assets at their current 
value rather than historical cost.  The revised reserves can be included in the capital base 
given that authorities find the assets to be reasonably valued, reflecting potential 
variation in price and possible forced sale. There is a condition of 55% discount of the 
difference between historic cost and market value.  
3. General Provisions/General Loan Loss Reserves 
Reserves held as a buffer to potential future losses can be included in tier 2, under the 
condition that they have not been assigned to specific assets or are created against 
identified losses and verifiable depreciation of assets value. Due to uncertainty about 
the value of balance-sheet assets and unidentified losses, an additional condition is put 
on this category of capital to be included in Tier 2. General provisions can not be more 
than 1.25% of risk-weighted assets.  
4. Hybrid Debt Capital Instruments 
Capital instruments with specific qualities of debt and equity. The specified 
characteristics affect its quality as capital; they have to be able to support potential losses 
without causing liquidation. On a country-to-country basis, conditions for these 
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instruments vary, but there is a set of requirements in order to be in line with the 
international regulations52. 
5. Subordinated Term Debt 
Subordinated debt has a higher risk than other constituents of Tier 2 capital do. Hence, 
additional requirements are put on these instruments in order to make them qualified as 
capital. Instruments in this category must have an original fixed maturity of minimum 
five years, value up to 50 % of core capital and subject to satisfactory depreciation (write 
off) schemes53 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988, pp. 4-7, 18-20).  
Risk Weights 
In addition to the focus on credit risk, the Basel Committee recognized the problem with 
transferring of risk between countries. The committee decided upon a differentiation of 
countries sectioning countries into the OECD54  and non- or outside the OECD countries. The 
OECD countries are considered to be of high credit standing and transactions with these 
countries attracted lower risk weights55. To preserve the international interbank market there 
are peculiar regulations for interbank claims.  
Collateral reduces risk, but to what extent is hard to determine due to instability in value of 
assets used as collateral. As a result, the Basel Committee have no standard process of assigning 
risk weights to collateralized assets. The only standard regulation outlined in Basel I is for assets 
collateralized by cash or securities issued by OECD governments. These assets attract the same 
weight as the underlying collateral (zero or low weight). For assets with guarantees the same 
regulations apply. The risk weight assigned is equivalent with that attracted by the guarantor56. 
                                                          
52 Requirements include the instruments to be unsecured, subordinated and fully paid-up. They are not redeemable 
without supervisory authority’s consent, they can be used to cover losses without forcing the bank to deviate from 
normal activities and even though interests on these instruments cannot be reduced or abandoned, they should 
allow for delay in payments of interests (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988, p. 19).  
53 A cumulative discount factor of 20% per year is be applied during the last five years to maturity. Due to the fact 
that these instruments can not be used to cover losses they are limited to 50% of tier 1.  
54 In context of Basel regulations, the OECD constitute countries that are full members of OECD or have 
concluded special lending arrangements with the IMF associated with the Fund’s General Arrangements to 
borrowing. 
55 Claims on governments of the OECD countries attract risk weight of zero (low weight if interest risk is 
incorporated. Claims on governments outside the OECD can attract the same risk weight, given that claims are 
issued and funded in the national currency.   
56 For non-OECD incorporated banks and entities additional conditions apply.  
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For loans backed by residential property, that is rented or occupied by the debtor, a risk weight 
of 50% is applied (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988, pp. 8-14, 21-24).  
On Balance Sheet Assets 
 Table 2- On Balance Sheet Assets 
Risk-
weight* 
Assets 
0% - Cash including (at national preference) gold bars in own vaults or 
allocated, but backed by liabilities. 
- Claims on central governments and central banks issued and funded in 
national currency. 
- Other claims on OECD central governments and central banks.  
- Claims collateralized by cash of OECD central government securities or 
guaranteed by OECD central governments. 
 
10%  
20% - Claims on multilateral development banks57 and claims guaranteed by or 
collateralized by securities issued by these banks. 
- Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and loans guaranteed by 
OECD incorporated banks. 
- Claims on banks incorporated in countries outside the OECD with a 
residual maturity of up to one year and loans with a residual maturity of 
up to one year guaranteed by banks incorporated in countries outside the 
OECD.  
- Claims on non-domestic OECD public-sector entities, excluding central 
government, and loans guaranteed by such entities.  
- Cash items on process of collection. 
50% - Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property that is or will be 
occupied by the borrower or that is rented. 
100% - Claims on private sector. 
                                                          
57 IBRD, IADB, AsDB, AfDB EIB. Multilateral development banks in which G-10 countries are shareholding 
members may, at national discretion, also attract 20 % weight.  
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- Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a residual maturity 
of over one year. 
- Claims on central governments outside the OECD (unless denominated 
and funded in national currency. 
- Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector. 
- Premises, plant, equipment, and other fixed assets. 
- Real estate and other investments (including non-consolidated investment 
participations in other companies). 
- Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless deducted form capital). 
- All other assets. 
Source: (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988, pp. 21-22) 
* 0, 10, 20, 50 % (at national preference): Claims on domestic public sector entities, excluding 
central government, and loans guaranteed by such entities.  
Off Balance Sheet Items 
The committee takes into account the risk of the off-balance sheet assets. The exposure to risk 
is determined by a “credit conversion factor” decided for particular instruments and 
transactions. The factors are derived from estimates of size, probability of credit exposures and 
a relative degree of credit risk58. In valuing the risk, the factors are multiplied by the risk weight 
relevant to the class of counterparty on-balance-sheet transaction.  
Table 3- Off  Balance Sheet Exposures 
Credit 
Conversion 
Factors 
Instruments 
0% - Commitments (e.g. formal standby facilities and credit lines) with an 
original maturity of up to one year, or which can be unconditionally 
cancelled at any time.  
20% - Short-term self-liquidating trade-related contingencies (such 
documentary credits collateralized by the underlying shipments). 
                                                          
58 From the committee’s 1986 paper “The management of banks’ off-balance-sheet exposures: a supervisory 
perspective”. 
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50% - Certain transaction-related contingent items (e.g. performance bonds, 
bid bonds, warranties and standby letters of credit related to particular 
transactions).  
- Note issuance facilities and revolving underwriting facilities. 
- Other commitments (e.g. formal standby facilities and credit lines) 
with an original maturity of over one year.  
100% - Direct credit substitutes .e.g. general guarantees of indebtedness 
(including standby letters of credit serving as financial guarantees for 
loans and securities) and acceptances (including endorsement with the 
character of acceptance).  
- Sale and repurchase agreements and asset sales with recourse59 where 
the credit risk remains with the bank.  
- Forward asset purchase, forward deposits and partly paid shares and 
securities59, which present commitments with certain drawdown.  
Source: (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988, pp. 23-34) 
*For items related to interests and exchange rate (swaps, options, futures, etc.), there are two 
optional calculation methods for risk approved by the committee, current exposure method and 
original exposure method60.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59 These items will be weighted based on the type of assets not the type of counterparty the transaction has been 
made. Reverse repos will be treated as collateralized loans, with exposure to the counterparty as risk measurement. 
In cases of the asset being a security, which attracts advantageous risk weighting, the asset is perceived as collateral 
and the weight would be reduced correspondingly.   
60 Due to lack of relevance of these instruments for this particular paper, I will not go further in to the two 
calculation methods.  
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Appendix 2- Basel II 
Additional Capital Restrictions 
Investments by banks in commercial companies exceeding certain materiality levels61 are to be 
deducted form capital with 50% from Tier 1 and 50 % from Tier 2. The limits for Tier 2 and 
Tier 3 capital in relation to Tier 1 is based on Tier 1 capital after deducting goodwill, but before 
deduction of investments.  
For banks using the internal-ratings-based (IRB) approach, the option to use general 
provisions/general loss reserves as Tier 2 capital is removed. Banks using IRB methods for 
exposures to securitization or probability of default (PD)/ loss given default (LGD) for 
exposures to equity must first deduct expected losses (EL). If a bank uses the IRB approach for 
other assets have to compare total eligible provisions to total EL62 calculated within the IRB 
method.  If EL minus eligible provisions is negative, the difference must be deducted 50% form 
Tier 1 and 50% from Tier 2. If it is positive the difference qualify as Tier 2 capital up to 0.6% 
of risk-weighted assets (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, pp. 9-12, 14-17).  
Short-term Subordinated Debt Covering Market Risk – Tier 3 
Basel II allow for national authorities to introduce a third tier of capital, Tier 3, for the sole 
purpose of meeting the capital requirements for market risks. Tier 3 capital must meet the 
definition of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital and is limited to 250% of Tier 1 capital required to support 
market risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, p. 17).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 National accounting and regulatory authorities will determine these levels. 
62 Sum of expected losses associated with the representative exposures and multiply with exposure at default 
(EAD).  
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Appendix 3- Basel III 
Specific criteria for the tiers of capital under Basel III. To qualify as capital for the purpose of 
keeping adequate capital in line with the Basel III minimum standards. The criteria presented 
is a supplement to the description of the tiers in subsection 3.3.1.   
Table 4- Criteria for Common Share Tier 1 Capital 
Criteria for Classification as Common Shares for Regulatory Capital Purposes 
1. Represents the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the bank. 
2. Entitled to a claim on the residual assets that is proportional with its share of issued 
capital, after all senior claims have been repaid in liquidation (i.e. has an unlimited 
and variable claim, not a fixed or capped claim). 
3. Principal is perpetual and never repaid outside of liquidation (setting aside 
discretionary repurchases or other means of effectively reducing capital in a 
discretionary manner that is allowable under relevant law). 
4. The bank does nothing to create an expectation at issuance that the instrument will be 
bought back, redeemed or cancelled nor do the statutory or contractual terms provide 
any feature which might give rise to such an expectation. 
5. Distributions are paid out of distributable items (retained earnings included). The 
level of distributions is not in any way tied or linked to the amount paid in at issuance 
and is not subject to a contractual cap (except to the extent that a bank is unable to 
pay distributions that exceed the level of distributable items). 
6. There are no circumstances under which the distributions are obligatory. Non 
payment is therefore not an event of default. 
7. Distributions are paid only after all legal and contractual obligations have been met 
and payments on more senior capital instruments have been made. This means that 
there are no preferential distributions, including in respect of other elements classified 
as the highest quality issued capital. 
8. It is the issued capital that takes the first and proportionately greatest share of any 
losses as they occur. Within the highest quality capital, each instrument absorbs losses 
on a going concern basis proportionately and pari passu with all the others. 
9. The paid in amount is recognized as equity capital (i.e. not recognized as a liability) 
for determining balance sheet insolvency. 
10. The paid in amount is classified as equity under the relevant accounting standards. 
 
 
82 
 
11. It is directly issued and paid-in and the bank can not directly or indirectly have funded 
the purchase of the instrument. 
12. The paid in amount is neither secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or 
related entity or subject to any other arrangement that legally or economically 
enhances the seniority of the claim. 
13. It is only issued with the approval of the owners of the issuing bank, either given 
directly by the owners or, if permitted by applicable law, given by the Board of 
Directors or by other persons duly authorized by the owners. 
14. It is clearly and separately disclosed on the bank’s balance sheet. 
Source: (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, pp. 14-15) 
Table 5- Criteria for Additional Tier 1 Capital 
Criteria for Inclusion in Additional Tier 1 Capital 
1. Issued and paid-in 
2. Subordinated to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the bank 
3. s neither secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or related entity or other 
arrangement that legally or economically enhances the seniority of the claim vis-à-
vis bank creditors 
4. Is perpetual, i.e. there is no maturity date and there are no step-ups or other incentives 
to redeem 
5. May be callable at the initiative of the issuer only after a minimum of five years:  
a. To exercise a call option a bank must receive prior supervisory approval; and  
b.  A bank must not do anything which creates an expectation that the call will be 
exercised; and  
c. Banks must not exercise a call unless:  
i.  They replace the called instrument with capital of the same or better quality 
and the replacement of this capital is done at conditions which are sustainable 
for the income capacity of the bank; or  
ii. The bank demonstrates that its capital position is well above the minimum 
capital requirements after the call option is exercised. 
6. Any repayment of principal (e.g. through repurchase or redemption) must be with 
prior supervisory approval and banks should not assume or create market expectations 
that supervisory approval will be given 
7. Dividend/coupon discretion:  
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a. the bank must have full discretion at all times to cancel distributions/payments 
b. cancellation of discretionary payments must not be an event of default  
c. banks must have full access to cancelled payments to meet obligations as they fall 
due  
d. cancellation of distributions/payments must not impose restrictions on the bank 
except in relation to distributions to common stockholders. 
8. Dividends/coupons must be paid out of distributable items 
9. The instrument cannot have a credit sensitive dividend feature, that is a 
dividend/coupon that is reset periodically based in whole or in part on the banking 
organization’s credit standing. 
10. The instrument cannot contribute to liabilities exceeding assets if such a balance sheet 
test forms part of national insolvency law. 
11. Instruments classified as liabilities for accounting purposes must have principal loss 
absorption through either (i) conversion to common shares at an objective pre-
specified trigger point or (ii) a write-down mechanism which allocates losses to the 
instrument at a pre-specified trigger point. The write-down will have the following 
effects:  
a. Reduce the claim of the instrument in liquidation;  
b. Reduce the amount re-paid when a call is exercised; and  
c. Partially or fully reduce coupon/dividend payments on the instrument. 
12. Neither the bank nor a related party over which the bank exercises control or 
significant influence can have purchased the instrument, nor can the bank directly or 
indirectly have funded the purchase of the instrument 
13. The instrument cannot have any features that hinder recapitalization, such as 
provisions that require the issuer to compensate investors if a new instrument is issued 
at a lower price during a specified time frame 
14. If the instrument is not issued out of an operating entity or the holding company in 
the consolidated group (e.g. a special purpose vehicle – “SPV”), proceeds must be 
immediately available without limitation to an operating entity18 or the holding 
company in the consolidated group in a form which meets or exceeds all of the other 
criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital 
Source: (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, pp. 15-17) 
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Table 6- Criteria for Tier 2 Capital 
Criteria for Inclusion in Tier 2 Capital 
1. Issued and paid-in 
2. Subordinated to depositors and general creditors of the bank 
3. Is neither secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or related entity or other 
arrangement that legally or economically enhances the seniority of the claim vis-à-
vis depositors and general bank creditors 
4. Maturity:  
a. minimum original maturity of at least five years  
b. recognition in regulatory capital in the remaining five years before maturity will 
be amortized on a straight line basis  
c.  there are no step-ups or other incentives to redeem 
5. May be callable at the initiative of the issuer only after a minimum of five years:  
a. To exercise a call option a bank must receive prior supervisory approval;  
b. A bank must not do anything that creates an expectation that the call will be 
exercised; and  
c. Banks must not exercise a call unless:  
i. They replace the called instrument with capital of the same or better  
quality and the replacement of this capital is done at conditions which are  
sustainable for the income capacity of the bank20; or  
ii. The bank demonstrates that its capital position is well above the minimum 
capital requirements after the call option is exercised. 
6. The investor must have no rights to accelerate the repayment of future scheduled 
payments (coupon or principal), except in bankruptcy and liquidation. 
7. The instrument cannot have a credit sensitive dividend feature, that is a 
dividend/coupon that is reset periodically based in whole or in part on the banking 
organization’s credit standing. 
8. Neither the bank nor a related party over which the bank exercises control or 
significant influence can have purchased the instrument, nor can the bank directly or 
indirectly have funded the purchase of the instrument 
9. If the instrument is not issued out of an operating entity or the holding company in 
the consolidated group (e.g. a special purpose vehicle – “SPV”), proceeds must be 
immediately available without limitation to an operating entity or the holding 
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company in the consolidated group in a form which meets or exceeds all of the other 
criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 Capital  
Source: (Basel Committe on banking supervision, 2011, pp. 18-19) 
Global Liquidity Standard 
Table 7- Assets 
Factors are to be multiplied with the total amount of each item (applies to table 7-9)  
Item Factor 
Level 1 assets:  
- Coins and bank notes 
- Qualifying marketable securities from sovereigns, central banks,  
PSEs, and multilateral development banks 
- Qualifying central bank reserves 
- Domestic sovereign or central bank debt for non-0% risk-weighted  
Sovereigns 
 
 
100% 
Level 2A assets (maximum of 40% of HQLA)  
- Sovereign, central bank, multilateral development banks, and PSE 
assets qualifying for 20% risk weighting 
- Qualifying corporate debt securities rated AA- or higher 
- Qualifying covered bonds rated AA- or higher 
 
 
85% 
Level 2B assets (maximum of 15% of HQLA)  
- Qualifying RMBS 
- Qualifying corporate debt securities rated between A+ and BBB- 
- Qualifying common equity shares 
75% 
50% 
50% 
Total value of HQLA  
Source: (Basel committe on banking supervision, 2013, p. 66) 
Table 8- Cash Outflows 
Retail deposits  
Demand deposits and term deposits (less than 30 days maturity) 
- Stable deposits (deposit insurance scheme meets additional 
criteria) 
- Stable deposits 
- Less stable retail deposits 
 
3% 
5% 
10% 
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Term deposits with residual maturity greater than 30 days 0% 
Unsecured wholesale funding  
Demand and term deposits (less than 30 days maturity) provided by  
small business customers: 
- Stable deposits 
- Less stable deposits 
 
 
5% 
10% 
Operational deposits generated by clearing, custody and cash  
management activities 
- Portion covered by deposit insurance 
25% 
 
5% 
Cooperative banks in an institutional network (qualifying deposits with  
the centralized institution) 
25% 
Non-financial corporates, sovereigns, central banks, multilateral  
development banks, and PSEs 
- If the entire amount fully covered by deposit insurance scheme 
40% 
 
20% 
Other legal entity customers 100% 
Secured funding  
- Secured funding transactions with a central bank counterparty or 
backed by Level 1 assets with any counterparty. 
- Secured funding transactions backed by Level 2A assets, with 
any counterparty 
- Secured funding transactions backed by non-Level 1 or non-
Level 2A assets, with domestic sovereigns, multilateral 
development banks, or domestic PSEs as a counterparty 
-  Backed by RMBS eligible for inclusion in Level 2B 
-  Backed by other Level 2B assets 
- All other secured funding transactions 
0% 
 
15% 
 
25% 
 
 
25% 
50% 
100% 
Additional requirements  
Liquidity needs (e.g. collateral calls) related to financing transactions, 
derivatives and other contracts 
3 notch 
downgrade 
Market valuation changes on derivatives transactions (largest absolute  
net 30-day collateral flows realized during the preceding 24 months) 
Look back 
approach 
Valuation changes on non-Level 1 posted collateral securing derivatives 20% 
Excess collateral held by a bank related to derivative transactions that  100% 
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could contractually be called at any time by its counterparty 
Liquidity needs related to collateral contractually due from the reporting  
bank on derivatives transactions 
100% 
Increased liquidity needs related to derivative transactions that allow  
collateral substitution to non-HQLA assets 
100% 
ABCP, SIVs, conduits, SPVs, etc.:  
Liabilities from maturing ABCP, SIVs, SPVs, etc. (applied to maturing 
amounts and returnable assets) 
100% 
Asset Backed Securities (including covered bonds) applied to maturing 
amounts. 
100% 
Currently undrawn committed credit and liquidity facilities provided to:  
Retail and small business clients 5% 
non-financial corporates, sovereigns and central banks, multilateral  
development banks, and PSEs 
10% for credit 
30% for liquidity 
Banks subject to prudential supervision 40% 
Other financial institutions (include securities firms, insurance  
companies)  
40% for credit 
100% for 
liquidity 
Other legal entity customers, credit and liquidity facilities 100% 
Other contingent funding liabilities (such as guarantees, letters of credit, 
revocable credit and liquidity facilities, etc.)  
- Trade finance 
- Customer short positions covered by other customers’ collateral 
National 
discretion 
0-5% 
50% 
Any additional contractual outflows 100% 
Net derivative cash outflows 100% 
Any other contractual cash outflows 100% 
Total cash outflows  
Source: (Basel committe on banking supervision, 2013, pp. 67-68) 
Table 9-Cash Inflows 
Maturing secured lending transactions backed by the following  
collateral: 
 
Level 1 assets 0% 
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Level 2 assets 15% 
Level 2B assets 
- Eligible RMBS 
- Other assets 
 
25% 
50% 
Margin lending backed by all other collateral 50% 
All other assets 100% 
Credit or liquidity facilities provided to the reporting bank 0% 
Operational deposits held at other financial institutions (include deposits  
held at centralized institution of network of co-operative banks) 
0% 
Other inflows by counterparty: 
- Amounts to be received from retail counterparties 
- Amounts to be received from non-financial wholesale 
counterparties, from transactions other than those listed in 
above inflow categories 
- Amounts to be received from financial institutions and central 
banks, from transactions other than those listed in above inflow 
categories 
 
 
50% 
50% 
 
 
100% 
Net derivative cash inflows 100% 
Other contractual cash inflows National 
discretion 
Total cash inflows  
Total net cash outflows = Total cash outflows minus min [total cash  
inflows, 75% of gross outflows] 
 
LCR = Stock of HQLA / Total net cash outflows  
Source: (Basel committe on banking supervision, 2013, p. 69) 
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Appendix 4- Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
First Modigliani and Miller (MM) assumed neutral taxes, no asymmetric information, no 
bankruptcy costs and no transaction costs. Second, they defined firms in classes based on 
equivalent returns on shares. Firms in each class were thereby homogeneous. Second, they used 
Marshallian price theory with perfect markets and perfect competition. Under the Marshallian 
theory, price per dollars’ worth of expected return is equal for all shares in one firm class. The 
price is proportional with the expected return in a rate  with a price  and expected return 
the price would be:  
 where 63 is a constant for all firms j in class k.  
In the article (MM) considered a random company j with the expected return on company assets, 
 (before deduction of interests).  Defining  as the market value of the debt and as the 
market value of common stocks, the market value of all securities (company value) can be 
written as: . Which implies, in equilibrium, that: 
(1)  , for any firm j in class k. 
Equation (1) shows that the market value of a company is independent of capital structure and 
is determined by capitalizing its expected return at the rate  suitable to its class. 
By defining average cost of capital as the expected return to company value: . We can write: 
(2) , for any firm j, in class k.   
                                                          
63 Pk have several economic interpretations 
- Expected return 
- is the price which the investor have to pay for a dollar’s worth of expected return 
- I compliance with theory on bonds with no maturity pk can be interpreted as  the market rate of 
capitalization for the expected value of uncertain steams of the type created by the kth class of firms. 
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Equation (2) implies that the average cost of capital for any firm is independent of capital 
structure and is and is equal to the capitalization rate of pure equity stream of its class 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958, pp. 266-269).  
If equation 1 and 2 do not hold, there is possibilities for arbitrage, but as investors utilize the 
arbitrage opportunities, the value of overpriced shares will fall and that of underpriced shares 
will rise, thereby remove divergence between market values of the firms. (Modigliani & Miller, 
1958, p. 269)  
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Appendix 5- Impact of Liquidity Requirements on Lending 
Spreads 
Calculations based on the Basel Committee “An assessment of the long-term economic 
impact of stronger capital and liquidity requirements”. The paper research costs of meeting 
the requirements without reducing profitability (ROE). 
Table 10-Impact of Increases in Capital and Liquidity Requirements in Lending Spreads 
(in basis points) 
Increase in capital 
ratio (percentage 
points) 
Cost to 
meet 
capital (A) 
Cost to 
meet 
NSFR (B) 
Total 
(A+B) 
Cost to meet 
NSFR (C) 
Total 
(A+C) 
  Assuming 
RWA 
unchanged 
 Accounting for 
decline in RWA 
 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
0 
13 
26 
39 
52 
65 
78 
25 
25 
25 
24 
24 
24 
23 
25 
38 
51 
63 
76 
89 
101 
14 
13 
13 
11 
8 
6 
5 
14 
26 
39 
50 
60 
71 
83 
Inter-quartile range 
(25th to 75th 
percentile for 1 
percentage point 
change in capital 
9 to 19 16 to 46  11 to 25  
Source: (Basel committe on Banking Supervision, 2010, p. 23)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
Appendix 6- Capital Requirements and Credit Risk Premiums 
It should be noted that these calculations apply to Spain. Due to the fact that Spain is one of the 
countries with severe sovereign debt problems causing problem for the real economy and 
economic growth the numbers are expected to be higher than for countries that are closer to a 
“normal” real economy situation. However, the calculations are based on the requirements of 
the Basel regulations; hence, it is reasonable to argue that the observed trend (overall picture) 
applies to other countries, albeit at a different scope. These calculations take into account capital 
requirements, liquidity requirements and leverage ratio (all new regulations of the Basel II and 
Basel III provisions).  
Table 11 shows the capital requirements in percentage, for loans to SMEs viewing SMEs as 
part of a retail portfolio.  
Table 11- Capital Requirements for SMEs Considered as Retail 
 
Source: (Cardone-Riportella, et al., 2011, p. 32) 
*PD is probability of default, LGD is loss given default (assumed 45%), CR is the capital 
requirement (regulatory capital), as a percentage of the exposure at default (EAD) calculated 
by using equation (5) in Table 14 for Basel II and equation (6) for Basel III. Weight is calculated 
using the percent of firms in each rating class. Cum weight is the product of (CR) and the 
weights cumulated to obtain the total requirement. Cases is the distribution of total firms and 
Default is the number of default firms for each class.  
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Table 12 shows the capital requirements, in percentage, for a loan to an SME in the corporate 
category, with average annual sales of €12.1 million. 
Table 12- Capital Requirements for SMEs Considered as Corporate (sales below €25 
millions) 
 
Source: (Cardone-Riportella, et al., 2011, p. 33) 
* Assumed maturity of the operation is 3 years. CR is calculated using equation (8) for Basel II 
and equation (9) for Basel III in Table 14. Other variables have the same indications as for 
Table 11.  
Table 13 shows the capital requirements, in percentage, for a loan to an SME in the corporate 
category, with average annual sales of €33.4 million.  
Table 13- Capital Requirements for SMEs Considered as Corporate (sales between 
€25millions and €50 millions) 
 
Source: (Cardone-Riportella, et al., 2011, p. 33) 
* Assumed maturity of the operation is 5 years. The other indicators indicate the same as Table 
12.  
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Table 14- Equations for Calculating Capital Requirements (CR) 
 
*According to the Basel II and Basel III accord. 
Source: (Cardone-Riportella, et al., 2011, p. 25) 
Table 15 shows the credit risk premiums for SMEs for the internal ratings based approach. 
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Table 15- Credit Risk Premiums for SMEs, as a Percentage of the EAD 
 
Source: (Cardone-Riportella, et al., 2011, p. 34) 
* PD is from Tables 11-13, LGD is assumed 45%, EL is the expected loss as percent of exposure 
to risk (estimated as the product of both PD and LGD), ROE is the average return on equity 
(2000-2009), and CR is from Tables 11-13. ROE*CR is the opportunity cost of regulatory 
capital and CRP is the Credit Risk Premium (sum of expected loss (EL) and the opportunity 
cost of the regulatory capital (ROE x CR)).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
